



PERSPECTIVES

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Rapanos Guidance III – “Waters” Revisited

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On May 2, 2011, the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Army Corps of Engineers² issued draft joint guidance³ for the interpretation of the phrase “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act (CWA).⁴ Determinations of CWA jurisdiction are critical for the agencies in issuing permits to fill wetlands under Section 404 of the CWA⁵ and in CWA enforcement actions.⁶ The proposed guidance purports to “clarify” how the agencies will “understand” existing requirements of the CWA and identify waters protected by the CWA “in light of” the holdings in *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers* (“SWANCC”) and *Rapanos v. United States* (“*Rapanos*”).⁷ As argued below, the guidance would, if issued in its current form, do more than “clarify understanding.” Instead, it would provide the agencies a basis for exercising broader authority over the nation’s waters than current policy supports. This expansion would be wrought by a few definitional and linguistic changes, some of which would be consistent with the CWA as interpreted in *Rapanos* and *SWANCC* and others which would be inconsistent.

To understand these issues, it is important to understand how waters over which the Corps and EPA have jurisdiction are defined in relevant statutes and regulations. Under the CWA, the term “navigable waters” is used for waters to which the act applies for several purposes including, but not limited to (1) Section 402 permitting (discharges to surface water); (2) Section 404 permitting (discharges into wetlands); and (3) enforcement related to discharges to water.⁸ The term “navigable waters” is defined in the CWA as “waters of the

United States, including the territorial seas.”⁹ “Waters of the United States,” in turn, is broadly defined in agency regulations to include both traditionally navigable waters¹⁰ and other types of waters, including wetlands and “isolated waters” that may or may not be “navigable” as that word is commonly used.¹¹

In *SWANCC*,¹² the Court ruled that federal authority under the CWA does not extend to isolated waters. The case involved a group of Illinois municipalities that had organized themselves into a municipal corporation known as the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, or “SWANCC.” SWANCC purchased a 533-acre site for disposing of solid waste, but the Corps denied the permit required under Section 404 of the CWA to fill 17.6 acres of small, seasonal ponds and ditches, and SWANCC sought judicial review of the Corps’ decision. The Corps based its assertion of jurisdiction over the waters at issue on the “migratory bird rule,”¹³ which provided that waters used as habitat for migratory birds established the necessary connection to interstate commerce for a water to be jurisdictional. The Court held, however, that the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction on this basis exceeded the authority granted to it under Section 404(a) of the CWA. The Court held that the agencies’ expansive definition of the term “waters of the United States” was so broad that the word “navigable” as used in the CWA had become meaningless. The Court believed that Congress’ use of the word “navigable” demonstrated that, in enacting the CWA, it had in mind “[the Corps’] traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”¹⁴

OSAH Reporter	6
From the Chairman	7
Save the Date	7
Call for Professional Announcements	7

Georgia’s Voluntary Remediation Program: Two Years Later	8
2011 Newsletter Editorial Board	20
2011 Law Section Officers.....	20

In *Rapanos*,¹⁵ the Supreme Court examined the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands that were located near "ditches or manmade drains" that "eventually" emptied into "traditional navigable waters."¹⁶ One of the wetlands was separated from the nearby ditch by a man-made berm.¹⁷ The Court endeavored to determine whether the wetlands were "waters of the United States" subject to jurisdiction under the CWA,¹⁸ and to provide an understandable framework making the determination. According to the evidence as viewed by the Court, it was "not clear whether the connections between these wetlands and the nearby drains and ditches [were] continuous or intermittent, or whether the nearby drains and ditches contain[ed] continuous or merely occasional flows of water."¹⁹

The Court issued five opinions, none of which was accepted by a majority of the Court. The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, stated that the term waters of the United States includes "only . . . relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water" and that only wetlands with a "continuous surface connection" to other jurisdictional waters are considered to be "adjacent" and protected by the CWA.²⁰ Scalia also explained that the term "waters of the United States" as used in the CWA should be limited to those that are "navigable in fact or susceptible of being rendered so."²¹ Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, using a different approach, held that "waters of the United States" include only wetlands that have a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters, meaning that the wetlands must, "either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable'."²² Kennedy explained that such traditional navigable waters include only waters that are "navigable in fact or susceptible of being made so."²³ Justice Stevens, and the three justices who joined in his dissenting opinion, would have upheld CWA jurisdiction over the wetlands parcels under the agencies' existing regulations and under either the plurality test or Justice Kennedy's significant nexus analysis.²⁴

Two earlier agency guidance documents issued by EPA and the Corps have attempted to clarify jurisdiction under *Rapanos*.²⁵ The second guidance is currently effective.²⁶ As discussed below, the earlier versions of the guidance were somewhat limited in scope and also were more faithful to *Rapanos*, *SWANCC*, the CWA, and current regulations. However, they have had limited value as guidance, giving the agencies little assurance that the evidence they may gather to support jurisdictional determinations and enforcement decisions will be sufficient to withstand challenges, particularly in appellate circuits where the Courts have not ruled on which *Rapanos* test will be applied.²⁷ An early example of the difficulties the agencies have faced is provided by *United States v. Robison*,²⁸ in which the 11th Circuit held that proof that a tributary had an uninterrupted connection to traditionally navigable water (which would

satisfy the Scalia test under *Rapanos*) was insufficient to prove jurisdiction, since only the Kennedy test would be allowed. Because the government investigated and tried the *Robison* case before the *Rapanos* decision was rendered, EPA and the Department of Justice could not have known what evidence would be needed to satisfy the application of the Kennedy tests to the facts. A more recent example of the difficulties EPA faces in developing evidence for enforcement cases is the criminal case of *United States v. Freedman*²⁹ in the Eastern District of North Carolina, where, in an order regarding jury instructions for trial, the trial judge ruled that the jury must be charged based on the Kennedy test alone.³⁰ This ruling is somewhat surprising in that it comes close on the heels of *Precon Development Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*,³¹ in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals appeared to leave the door open for application of either *Rapanos* test.³² The defendants in *Freedman* recently pled guilty and the judge's ruling will therefore not be tested on appeal.³³

The proposed guidance provides more detailed direction to the agencies for making jurisdictional calls and for developing the evidence needed to support their calls and to support enforcement. It also makes no secret that the agencies will use the guidance to attempt to expand their jurisdiction. As stated in the proposed guidance

the agencies expect, based on relevant science and recent field experience, that under the understandings stated in this draft guidance, the extent of waters over which the agencies assert jurisdiction under the CWA *will increase compared to the extent of waters over which jurisdiction has been asserted under existing guidance*, though certainly not to the full extent that it was typically asserted prior to the Supreme Court decisions in *SWANCC* and *Rapanos*.³⁴

While the agencies acknowledge that their proposed policy is intended to expand jurisdiction over waters of the United States, the second sentence of the guidance avers that the policy merely "clarifies how EPA and the Corps understand the existing requirements of the Clean Water Act . . . in light of *SWANCC* and *Rapanos*."³⁵ This implies that the agency believes the intended expansion of jurisdiction is consistent with these precedents. As shown below, in several instances, it is not.

In evaluating the scope of the proposed guidance, it is useful to consider the concept of "relevant water." As used in the guidance, a relevant water is the reference water for the significant nexus test³⁶--that is, it is the water to which the significant nexus test is applied to determine whether the water being evaluated is a jurisdictional water, referred to as a "navigable water" or "water of the United States" in the statute and as a "water of the United States" in the regulations.³⁷ In *Rapanos*, Justice Kennedy held that waters are jurisdictional if they have a "significant nexus" to waters that are "navigable-in-fact or that could reasonably be made

so.”³⁸ Such waters are thus the “relevant waters” under the Kennedy test.” Under the current guidance, the agencies use the term “traditional navigable waters,” alone, as the relevant water.³⁹ The proposed guidance would expand the relevant waters by adding interstate waters to traditionally navigable waters⁴⁰ so that all waters connected or adjacent to *either* interstate waters or traditionally navigable waters would henceforth be jurisdictional. As explained in more detail below, this is a significant expansion beyond the scope of the current guidance and the Supreme Court rulings. The magnitude of the expansion is currently unknown and will depend upon how many interstate waters exist that are not also traditionally navigable waters. Organization of the paper is roughly parallel to that of the guidance, beginning with the introductory paragraphs, and addressing each of the eight sections, in order.

The Introduction.

The introductory paragraphs summarize the legal basis for the guidance and its purposes, goals, and limitations. First, the guidance purports to “clarify” how EPA and the Corps will identify waters “in light of *SWANCC* and *Rapanos*.”⁴¹ Taking pains to explain that the document is merely guidance and “lacks the force of law,” the agencies state that the primary purpose of the document is to “describe for agency field staff the agencies’ current understandings” regarding the subject matter so they will benefit from lessons learned since 2008 when the existing guidance was issued.⁴² The guidance states it is intended to be “consistent with the statute, regulations, Supreme Court caselaw [sic], relevant science . . . and the agencies’ field experience.”⁴³ After a succinct briefing of *United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes*,⁴⁴ *SWANCC*,⁴⁵ and *Rapanos*,⁴⁶ the agencies state their intention to assert jurisdiction over waters that satisfy either the plurality standard or the Justice Kennedy standard in *Rapanos*.⁴⁷ The agencies acknowledge that the proposed guidance will result in their exercising jurisdiction over interstate waters not covered by earlier guidance, and asserts that the guidance will provide the legal basis for this increased coverage⁴⁸ It also asserts that the guidance will not affect any of the Section 404(f) exemptions from jurisdiction.⁴⁹ The agencies’ stated “expectation” that they will expand jurisdictional calls⁵⁰ under the proposed guidance contrasts with their approach under the current guidance, which they stated was “not intended to either expand or contract CWA jurisdiction but rather to effectively implement the decision by the Supreme Court in *Rapanos*.”⁵¹

Section 1: Traditional Navigable Waters

The first of the eight sections in the proposed guidance describes the term “traditional navigable waters,” which, in addition to interstate waters, are the relevant waters upon which the concept of significant nexus depends.⁵²

This section provides examples of waters to be considered TNWs. They include (a) waters subject to section 9 or 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and (b) waters currently used for commercial navigation, historically used for commercial navigation, or susceptible for future use for commercial navigation.⁵³ The latter category, according to the proposed guidance, also would include “commercial waterborne recreation,” with the guidance specifying that susceptibility to future use for commercial navigation may be demonstrated by “current boating and canoe trips for recreation or other purposes.”⁵⁴ Recreational use as evidence of navigability has evolved from the concept of navigability for the transport of goods by canoe,⁵⁵ and under this analysis such waters would arguably be properly considered TNWs. Existing agency regulations provide that the “other waters” category of “waters of the United States” include those used for recreation by interstate or foreign travelers, without tying the concept to traditional commerce and without designating them as navigable-in-fact.⁵⁶

The current guidance says very little about the meaning of the term TNW. The original *Rapanos* guidance,⁵⁷ however, was issued with a document entitled “Legal Definition of ‘Traditional Navigable Waters,’”⁵⁸ a four page legal memorandum explaining the legal underpinnings of the concept as envisioned by the agencies. In this document, the agencies explained that TNWs are equivalent to the waters defined in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), the “(a)(1) waters,” which are in turn essentially equivalent to the navigable in fact waters in the Kennedy test. Unlike in the proposed guidance, the original post-*Rapanos* description of TNW did not attempt to stretch the concept of navigability to include all commercial waterborne recreation. Instead, the agencies argued for a generous interpretation of navigability, citing favorably to *FPL Marine Hydro LLC v. FERC*,⁵⁹ which held that navigability could be based on “three experimental canoe trips taken specifically to demonstrate the river’s navigability.”⁶⁰ Under the proposed guidance, however, a water will be a TNW to the extent it can be paddled on or used for commercial waterborne recreation in addition to other accepted traditional concepts of navigability. The proposed guidance seems not to limit the concept of commercial waterborne recreation to recreation using boats, which could mean that recreational uses such as wading in smaller waters or flooded timber to bird watch, shoot ducks, or fish would qualify. If, for example, guided bird watching trips occurred in the types of isolated waters discussed in *SWANCC*, in which the Supreme Court held that the migratory bird rule could not justify jurisdiction,⁶¹ those isolated waters would become jurisdictional under the proposed guidance because birds used the waters. Would this result, which directly contradicts a Supreme Court holding, be accorded deference under the applicable standard?⁶² This extension of the concept of navigability arguably extends broadens the term TNW beyond what was contemplated

in the first two guidance documents. To the extent such an expansion is not unreasonable or in conflict with other authority, it may be accorded deference if challenged.⁶³

Section 2: Interstate Waters

Section 2 describes the agencies' view of "interstate waters," stating that they will assert jurisdiction over "all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across, or form part of, State boundaries."⁶⁴ The agencies will use the concept of stream order to determine what part of a river or stream is an interstate water. The order of a stream is, in effect, a branch of the stream. The agencies will deem the entire order or branch of a river or stream that crosses state lines to be jurisdictional.⁶⁵ In this section, the agencies describe a potentially substantial expansion of jurisdiction, announcing that they not only will consider interstate waters to be jurisdictional, but also [w]ill analyze *tributaries to interstate waters* . . . under Justice Kennedy's standard discussed in Section 4 below. Similarly, the agencies will analyze wetlands adjacent to *interstate waters* (except wetlands that are adjacent to interstate wetlands)⁶⁶ consistent with the treatment of adjacent wetlands under Justice Kennedy's standard discussed in Section 5 below.⁶⁷

Here, the agencies add a new category of waters to TNWs which, as discussed below, extends the scope of relevant waters beyond the TNWs described in the current guidance⁶⁸ and beyond the scope contemplated by Justice Kennedy in *Rapanos*.⁶⁹

Section 3: Significant Nexus Analysis

This section, which addresses the overall application of the Kennedy significant nexus analysis, is intended to be used as "general guidance for determining the presence or absence of a significant nexus"⁷⁰ and is followed by sections addressing specifically how the test will be applied to tributaries and adjacent wetlands. According to the proposed guidance, "[t]he agencies will assert jurisdiction over waters with a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters *or interstate waters* in accordance with *SWANCC* and *Rapanos*."⁷¹ The guidance then quotes Justice Kennedy in *Rapanos*:

In *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers*, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (*SWANCC*), the Court held, under the circumstances presented there, that to constitute 'navigable waters' under the Act, a water or wetland must possess a 'significant nexus' to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.⁷²

The guidance further asserts that there is but "one significant nexus standard for waters of the United States" which is satisfied by showing that waters, "either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of traditional navigable waters *or interstate waters*."⁷³

Section 3 establishes a sequence for the agencies to use in

applying the significant nexus test.⁷⁴ First, the relevant agency will examine the "resource type" of a water, that is, whether the water is a tributary, adjacent wetland, or "proximate other water, and consider all waters of the same type to be similarly-situated."⁷⁵ Next, the agencies will consider the "region" where the water is located to identify all similarly-situated waters in the region.⁷⁶ For this purpose, the "region" is the watershed that "drains to the nearest traditional navigable water or interstate water through a single point of entry."⁷⁷ The final step in the analysis is determining whether the water being evaluated and all similarly situated waters have a significant nexus to a TNW or interstate water. Functions of waters to be considered for this purpose include "sediment trapping, nutrient recycling, pollutant trapping and filtering, retention or attenuation of flood waters, runoff storage, and provision of aquatic habitat."⁷⁸ According to the guidance, hydrologic connectivity is not necessary to establish a nexus "because in some cases the lack of a hydrologic connection would be a sign of the water's function in relationship to the traditional navigable water or interstate water, such as retention of flood waters or pollutants that would otherwise flow downstream to the traditional navigable water or interstate water."⁷⁹

This section of the guidance would expand CWA jurisdiction in at least two ways. The first is the addition of the words "interstate waters" to the significant nexus test,⁸⁰ to the effect that interstate waters are made relevant waters for purposes of applying the significant nexus test.⁸¹ The current guidance limits relevant waters to TNWs, including



waters “used in commerce” and tidal waters, intentionally excluding interstate waters.⁸² If, as the proposed guidance provides, interstate waters become relevant waters for the significant nexus test, then not only would every stream reach, pond, or other wet feature that crosses a state line become jurisdictional, but also every wet feature with a significant nexus to such waters (that otherwise meets the requirements of the proposed guidance) would be subject to CWA jurisdiction. This expands the scope of jurisdictional waters well beyond the intent of the Supreme Court as expressed in *SWANCC* and *Rapanos*.⁸³

In an attempt to justify this expansion of relevant waters, the agencies published simultaneously with the guidance⁸⁴ an extensive legal memorandum regarding the inclusion of interstate waters in the guidance.⁸⁵ This legal memorandum is in addition to the discussion contained in the appendix to the proposed guidance.⁸⁶ These justifications, however, focus on how interstate waters are properly considered jurisdictional, citing abundant authority.⁸⁷ Being jurisdictional, however, is not equivalent to being relevant waters for applying the significant nexus test, and neither the appendix nor the legal memorandum addresses this issue directly. Nowhere do the agencies argue that interstate waters are either navigable in fact waters as required in *Rapanos*⁸⁸ or TNWs, as relevant waters are referred to by the agencies. Instead, the legal memorandum merely argues that interstate waters should be considered to be equivalent to “navigable waters,” repeatedly using the term interchangeably with “waters of the United

States.”⁸⁹ In short, these legal arguments offer no authority to support the concept that interstate waters are relevant waters for purposes of applying the significant nexus test.

Though the agencies do not provide direct legal support for the relevant waters concept, they argue that their interpretation in the guidance should be accorded “deference” under *Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*.⁹⁰ *Chevron* deference is a generous deference standard that requires a court to defer to the agency interpretation if it is a “permissible construction of the statute.”⁹¹ *Chevron* is the wrong deference standard, however, and applies to agency interpretations of statutes *via rule making*.⁹² For non-binding policy statements, such as agency guidance,⁹³ a less deferential standard applies. The current Supreme Court rule provides as follows:

Interpretations such as those in . . . policy statements, agency manuals and enforcement guidelines . . . which lack the force of law--do not warrant *Chevron*-style deference. They are “entitled to respect,” but only to the extent that they are persuasive, *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124, which is not the case here.”⁹⁴

Skidmore held that an agency policy statement must be examined in light of “the validity of its reasoning and its consistency with *earlier and later pronouncements*.”⁹⁵ This suggests that, in a conflict between the policy interpretation and an earlier or later Supreme Court holding, the Court’s holding would prevail.

Under *Skidmore*, Justice Kennedy’s “earlier pronouncement” regarding the nature of relevant waters trumps the broader agency interpretation in the guidance.⁹⁶ The conflict is apparent in the following excerpt from the Kennedy opinion in *Rapanos*:

While the plurality reads non-existent requirements into the Act, the dissent reads a central requirement out--namely, the requirement that the word “navigable” in “navigable waters” be given some importance. Although the Court has held that the statute’s language invokes Congress’ traditional authority over waters navigable in fact or susceptible of being made so, *SWANCC*, 531 U.S., at 172, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (citing *Appalachian Power*, 311 U.S., at 407-408, 61 S. Ct. 291, 85 L. Ed. 243), the dissent would permit federal regulation whenever wetlands lie alongside a ditch or drain, *however remote and insubstantial*, that eventually may flow into traditional navigable waters. The deference owed to the Corps’ interpretation of the statute does not extend so far.⁹⁷

Justice Kennedy would not agree that a relevant water can be one characterized solely by an accident of geopolitical determination, such as the drawing of state lines, even though it may be an insubstantial water in a remote area.



[See *Rapanos* on page 11](#)

OSAH Reporter

By Kasey Sturm, Esq., Stack & Associates, P.C.

Water Permitting

Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper, Inc. v. F. Allen Barnes, Director, Environmental Protection Division, Docket No. OSAH-BNR-WQC-1107476-60-Miller.

On June 1, 2011, Administrative Law Judge Kristin L. Miller issued a final decision in *Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper's* ("UCR") challenge to an NPDES permit issued by EPD to Forsyth County authorizing the discharge of up to six million gallons per day of treated wastewater to the Chattahoochee River from Forsyth County's Fowler & Shakerag Wastewater Reclamation Facilities (the "Fowler/Shakerag WRF"). The Court's ruling invalidated the NPDES permit for the Fowler/Shakerag WRF because the permit authorized the discharge of wastewater in violation of Georgia's "antidegradation" rule.

By way of background, Riverkeeper filed its appeal challenging the validity of the NPDES permit for the

Fowler/Shakerag WRF on Sept. 16, 2010. On Dec. 8, 2010, Miller addressed cross-motions for summary determination, resolving all but one claim - allegations that the permit, as issued, violated Georgia's antidegradation rule as to its limits on allowable effluent concentrations of fecal coliform bacteria and total phosphorus. Georgia's antidegradation rule, which mirrors the federal rule under the Clean Water Act, prohibits the lowering of water quality unless necessary for important social or economic development in the surrounding area. Accordingly, the remaining issue before the Court was whether the permit authorized a necessary lowering of water quality after consideration of the technical and economic feasibility of alternative treatment levels, or whether such degradation is unnecessary.


UCR argued that the permitted limits for fecal coliform and total phosphorus will unnecessarily degrade water quality in the river and proposed reduced discharge limits. EPD and Forsyth County argued that the permitted limits would not degrade water quality or, in the alternative, any degradation of water quality was necessary.

After nearly a week long hearing on this issue, Miller found that the permitted discharge would result in lower water quality in the Chattahoochee River. She further found that since Forsyth County can treat its wastewater and discharge significantly less pollution with minimal expense, the level of degradation [or lowering of water quality] authorized by the permit was not necessary to accommodate important social or economic development in the surrounding area. Miller remanded the matter to EPD for reissuance of the permit with more stringent monthly discharge limits for fecal coliform bacteria and total phosphorus.

Miller's decision is now on appeal before the Superior Court of Forsyth County.

Water Permitting

Altamaha Riverkeeper Inc. et. al. v. F. Allen Barnes, Director, Environmental Protection Division, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Docket No. OSAH-BNR-WQC-1031706-98-Walker (NPDES), OSAH-BNR-WQC-1031708-98-Walker (Surface Water).



Last July, Administrative Law Judge Ronit Walker addressed cross-motions for summary determination in the consolidated cases challenging both the NPDES and surface water withdrawal permits issued by EPD for Plant Washington. Walker issued an Order finding, with regard to the surface water withdrawal permit, that EPD had authorized an interbasin transfer without complying with applicable procedural requirements governing interbasin transfers; and the NPDES permit inappropriately allowed the use of an internal monitoring point without a supporting justification in the fact sheet that accompanied the permit, as required by law. Pursuant to a consent order proposed by all parties, both the NPDES and surface water withdrawal permits were remanded to EPD for further permitting proceedings consistent with the Court's Order.

Following remand, Petitioners filed a Second Amended Petition for Hearing on the NPDES permit. Petitioners did not further challenge the surface water withdrawal permit. Accordingly, Walker entered a dismissal without prejudice in the surface water withdrawal matter, OSAH-BNR-WQC-1031708-98-Walker. On June 16, 2011, He also entered an Order in the companion case dealing with the NPDES permit, again remanding the NPDES permit to the Director of EPD, this time for the limited purpose of allowing EPD to revise the Permit as it concerns the frequency of temperature monitoring. The Court will retain jurisdiction of this matter and all further proceedings will be stayed pending the remand.

Solid Waste Permitting

Stephens County Board of Commissioners v. F. Allen Barnes, Director, Environmental Protection Division, Department of Natural Resources and Wilbros, LLC, OSAH-BNR-SW-1126372-127-LFO

Petitioner Stephens County Board of Commissioners sought to challenge a Solid Waste Handling Permit issued by EPD to Wilbros, LLC., authorizing the operation of a solid waste handling facility in the vicinity of Petitioner's community recreation complex. The Director filed a Motion for Hearing on Standing. On April 12, 2011, after a hearing on the matter, Administrative Law Judge Lois F. Oakley dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support a conclusion that Petitioner qualifies as "an aggrieved or adversely affected person" with standing to challenge the issuance of the permit. In support of its ruling, the Court found that Petitioner's alleged injury from foul odors was based solely on the speculations of lay witnesses and devoid of any probative, scientific evidence. Likewise, Petitioner's alleged injury from diminution in income was found to be too speculative and contingent on the hypothesized effect of future operations.

From the Chairman...

We were glad to see many of you at the annual Environmental Law Section Summer Seminar at the King & Prince Beach and Golf Resort on St. Simons Island, Ga on Aug. 5-6. Our purpose is always to provide and discuss substantive issues of our field while giving you a chance to meet the leaders in our state and practice. Many thanks to our members, friends, sponsors, and the staff at ICLE who made the event successful.

James Griffin

Save the Date

The 2012 Environmental Law Section Summer Seminar will be held July 21-22 on Hilton Head Island

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Georgia's Voluntary Remediation Program: Two Years Later

By Hollister A. Hill, Partner, and Karlie S. Clemons, Associate, Troutman Sanders LLP

Prior to June 2009, Georgia law did not provide a voluntary remediation program for contaminated sites. Instead, contaminated sites were remediated under the Georgia Hazardous Substances Control Act (HSRA), otherwise known as Georgia's "superfund" program, which can be inflexible, costly and provides little, if any, incentive for responsible parties to take voluntary action toward site cleanup.

House Bill 248 created the Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP), allowing legal and technical flexibility and cost-effective methods for responsible parties to clean up sites that otherwise required cleanup under the stringent HSRA provisions. According to the VRP Act, the General Assembly sought to "encourage voluntary and cost-effective investigation and remediation of qualifying properties" by providing for flexibility and risk-based approaches to clean up of HSRA-listed and other sites. The VRP also provides payment to EPD for applying for the program and for reviewing the application and the site documentation for the cleanup of the site. Georgia's Environmental Protection Division (EPD) began accepting applications for the VRP as of Jan. 1, 2010.

This article briefly details Georgia's site remediation programs, under both HSRA and the VRP, with a focus on the VRP's progress, success and Program amendments since the Program began only two years ago.

Prior to 2009: Complications of Georgia's HSRA Program

Under HSRA, established in 1992, EPD has authority to investigate, remediate and hold property owners responsible for cleanup of sites contaminated with regulated substances. Under HSRA, EPD is tasked with determining which contaminated properties are placed on Georgia's Hazardous Site Inventory (HSI). To determine whether a site should be listed, EPD uses the Reportable Quantities Screening Method (RQSM), which uses a numerical equation to consider several factors – such as toxicity, quantity and physical state of the substance released, exposure to residents, accessibility of the site and proximity to drinking water wells. If the RQSM score for a particular site is above a threshold number for soil or groundwater, EPD will place the site on the HSI. Alternatively, EPD may place a site on the HSI if the site poses a threat to human health or the environment.

If EPD lists a site on the HSI, the site must meet

EPD's standards for remediation, which establish levels of various regulated substances intended to be protective of human health and the environment. EPD separates the sites on the HSI into five classes. For sites listed on the HSI, EPD will mandate that the responsible party conduct an investigation until the responsible party shows that the property complies with specific cleanup criteria set forth by the Risk Reduction Standards (RRS). If a site is listed on the HSI, the responsible party will also be required to prepare a Compliance Status Report (CSR), which details the extent of soil and groundwater contamination at the site and certifies to either compliance or noncompliance with the RRS. When a responsible party is unable to certify compliance with the RRS, EPD will require that the responsible party prepare a Corrective Action Plan, which essentially sets forth the remedial action plan.

HSRA liability is joint, several, and strict and its rigid procedural requirements are based on inflexible numerical standards which some argue often require responsible parties to remediate sites beyond what is necessary to protect human health and the environment. For example, HSRA requires that the contaminated area be defined by background concentration levels. Accordingly, even when background concentrations are irrelevant to the necessary cleanup of a particular site, HSRA's rigid one-size-fits all requirement mandates that the responsible party identify background concentrations. Additionally, HSRA typically requires excavation and removal of contaminated soil, irrespective of the actual risk presented and irrespective of other, equally as effective remediation methods.

HSRA also assumes that contaminated groundwater will be used as drinking water, thus requiring that groundwater be remediated to the appropriate RRS – even where there is no risk of human exposure, again imposing a one-size-fits all mandate. To delist a property from the HSI, a responsible party is required to certify that it has complied with RRS for both soil and groundwater. As a result of many of these requirements, the structure and implementation of HSRA can fail to allow for alternative, cost-effective remedies that would be equally as protective of human health and the environment at appropriate sites.

Aside from the difficulty of and cost imposed by HSRA remediation, not all contaminated sites fall under the HSRA program. Instead, HSRA requirements apply only to those properties with a RQSM score that exceeds the soil and groundwater thresholds. Sites with scores below these

thresholds are not listed on the HSI and are not in the HSRA program that eventually leads to agency approval.

Georgia's VRP: Benefits

The VRP enables responsible parties to focus on risk-based cleanups without certain unnecessary and costly HSRA requirements. The VRP provides for site-specific considerations and only mandates cleanup when contamination levels exceed certain thresholds that create risk to human health or the environment. For example, remediation of contaminated soil is required only where there is actual exposure. Similarly, groundwater is not necessarily required to be cleaned up to drinking water standards. Instead, VRP participants need to show that a site's groundwater concentrations are "protective of any established downgradient point of exposure," which EPD may interpret as including any drinking water located within 1,000 feet of an existing contamination plume. And unlike HSRA's requirement to investigate or remediate contamination to background standards, the VRP allows alternatives, including the ability to investigate or remediate to "[d]efault, residential cleanup standards." A VRP participant may also remove a site from the HSI simply by demonstrating to EPD that at the time of enrollment in the VRP there was no release in

excess of a reportable quantity. If the site was listed on the HSI because of a release to soil and not groundwater, the VRP does not require corrective action or compliance certification as to groundwater.

The VRP should result in cost savings while still remediating the site and protecting human health and the environment. While HSRA requires remediation irrespective of cost, the VRP does not require remediation and investigation where the cost is much higher than the benefit unless, in EPD's opinion, the contamination presents a danger

Georgia's VRP: Requirements

To participate in the VRP, both the site and the participant must qualify for the Program. The site must be listed on the HSI, must be a Brownfield property under Ga. Code Ann. § 12-8-205, or must otherwise have had a release of regulated substances. A site is ineligible for the VRP if it is listed on the National Priorities List (NPL) pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), is a permitted hazardous waste facility under Ga. Code Ann. § 12-8-66, or is otherwise undergoing response activities required by



the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The participant must either be the property owner of the site or have express permission to perform corrective action on the site. The participant may not be in violation of any judgment, order, statute, rule, or regulation subject to EPD enforcement authority and must adhere to any other criteria that the Georgia Board of Natural Resources requires.

To apply for the VRP, eligible participants must submit (1) a Voluntary Remediation Plan prepared by a Georgia-registered professional engineer or registered professional geologist; (2) a \$5,000 one-time, non-refundable fee; (3) copies of the warranty deed for the qualifying property; (4) the tax plat of the qualifying property and adjoining properties including tax parcel ID numbers; (5) graphic 3-D preliminary conceptual site model using all current information; (6) a Preliminary Remediation Plan; and (7) a table of delineation standards.

Importantly, participation in the VRP does not remove all HSRA obligations. If a VRP participant terminates enrollment in the Program, the site will continue to be listed on the HSI and thus the remediation required under HSRA is still required before EPD will remove the site from the HSI. Removal from the HSI will require meeting the appropriate HSRA RRS for soil and groundwater.

Georgia's VRP: 2010 VRP Amendments

Since enactment of the VRP in 2009, several notable revisions have been made to the Program. First, the Georgia General Assembly, through Senate Bill 78, created the Voluntary Remediation Escrow Account. The Account consists of the application fees and reimbursement fees collected by EPD through the VRP. The legislation directly authorized the EPD Director to spend the balance of the account in order to administer the VRP. Such costs include, for example, payment of state contractors used to administer the Program. The Director is also authorized to spend the interest earned on the escrow account to administer the Program, so long as the interest funds are expended in the same fiscal year as earned and the remaining interest is deposited into the State treasury. These VRP amendments became effective on June 1, 2010. Funding to allow EPD to oversee the VRP is critical to the success of the Program.

Second, on April 1, 2010, EPD issued a revised VRP application form to take the place of its initial Jan. 6, 2010 application form. In a letter on April 1, 2010, EPD Director Barnes indicated that "EPD ha[d] received numerous questions and suggestions regarding the approach taken for implementation" of the VRP. To address the concerns raised, "a technical workgroup was convened to develop improvements that would expand the level of participation in the Program while preserving its intent to encourage investigation, control exposure to hazardous substances, cleanup contaminated sites to protect Georgia's citizens, and reduce cleanup costs."

While the initial application form required that sites be fully investigated, tested, and planned before the sites could be enrolled in the VRP, the revised form makes the application process much less onerous for VRP applicants.

Since the April 1, 2010, revision, no changes have been made to the application process. EPD did, however, issue a Frequently Asked Questions document, which was last updated on November 15, 2010. This document is meant by EPD "to provide additional guidance" to the VRP instruction already available and is very helpful to VRP applicants

Georgia's VRP: Current Statistics and Outstanding Issues

The VRP has accepted applications only since January 2010. As of May 31, 2011, 48 VRP applications had been filed with EPD. Of those applications filed, as of May 31, 2011, 20 applications had been approved, seventeen were under review, two had been determined ineligible for the VRP, and two had been withdrawn.

Since the start of the VRP, only one site has completed the VRP and been removed from the HSI through the VRP. That site, HSI 10222, located in Atlanta, Fulton County, applied for the VRP on Jan. 19, 2010, and was approved into the VRP on June 30, 2010. Although Site 10222 was removed from the HSI through the VRP, the site had already satisfied HSRA Type 5 RRS, including monitoring and maintenance, prior to its acceptance into the VRP. No sites – including HSI 10222 – have been removed from the HSI as a result of investigations or cleanup work performed during VRP participation.

However, HSI 10222 is an example of how the VRP can benefit HSI sites that certify to HSRA Type 5 RRS. Under HSRA, sites that certify to Type 5 Standards must remain on the HSI and undergo corrective action until they comply with another (Type 1 – 4) Standard. In contrast, under the VRP, a site like HSI 10222 that certifies to Type 5 RRS can be removed from the HSI, which could have a positive impact on the marketability or potential use of the property.

While the VRP is a step toward more efficient and cost-effective site remediation in the state of Georgia, the Program is less than two years old and additional time is needed to enable a more thorough analysis as to whether the Program truly accomplishes its legislative intent to "encourage voluntary and cost-effective investigation and remediation of qualifying properties." Because no sites have completed the VRP based on investigative or cleanup work performed during VRP enrollment, there are to date no examples of actual VRP remediation cost savings. As time progresses and more sites complete the VRP process, a follow-up analysis will provide more insight. As Director Barnes recently commented, we are waiting to see the VRP "graduates."

Another jurisdictional expansion proposed in Section 3 characterizes “similarly situated waters”⁹⁸ as potentially including all waters in the watershed of the relevant TNW. According to the proposed guidance [t]he logical and scientifically valid “region”⁹⁹ for determining whether similarly situated waters have a significant nexus is the watershed that drains to the nearest traditional navigable water or interstate water through a single point of entry.¹⁰⁰

This application of “similarly situated” in the proposed guidance is much broader than in the current guidance, where “similarly situated” is interpreted to “include all wetlands adjacent to the same tributary.”¹⁰¹ The current guidance also does not extend the concept to the grouping of tributaries, deciding instead, as did Justice Kennedy, to confine its application to wetlands.¹⁰² The proposed guidance does not limit use of the concept of similarly situated to wetlands, instead applying it to waters generally. Like the interstate waters concept, the expanded view of what is similarly situated does not appear to be based on legal precedent or other legal authority. It is arguably a logical extension of current law, however,¹⁰³ and is not directly contradicted by *Rapanos*.¹⁰⁴ The Kennedy opinion appears to leave plenty of room for interpretation of the phrase, using it only once in the opinion without further explication.¹⁰⁵ If challenged, therefore, the interpretation of “similarly situated” in the proposed guidance may be more likely to survive a *Skidmore* analysis.

The proposed guidance takes pains to describe how the agencies should build a record to establish a significant nexus, describing what could be an involved process of evaluating characteristics that might affect downstream navigable-in-fact waters.¹⁰⁶ Noteworthy in this discussion is the suggestion that the agencies do not have to evaluate every similarly situated water within a watershed, but that a significant nexus determination may be based on an evaluation of a representative subset of adjacent and proximate waters, suggesting that each water will not have to be re-evaluated for each case, but only “as many waters of the same type as is necessary to support and document the presence or absence of a significant nexus for that type of water (*e.g.*, adjacent wetland, tributary or proximate other water).”¹⁰⁷

Section 4: Tributaries.

In Section 4 of the guidance, the agencies explain how they will apply the plurality and Kennedy standards of *Rapanos* to assert jurisdiction over tributaries. The section first defines tributary as a natural, man-made or man-altered water body that contributes flow to a TNW or interstate water “either directly or indirectly by means of other tributaries.”¹⁰⁸ Interestingly, in addition to the commonly understood meaning of the term, tributaries are said to include lakes

and “certain wetlands” that are part of the tributary system, in addition to rivers and streams.¹⁰⁹ The guidance provides that “erosional features such as gullies and rills” will not be considered jurisdictional, distinguishing them from streams with more defined beds and banks.¹¹⁰ However, despite the fulsome discussion of the “features,” no bright line distinctions are drawn between them and tributaries.

Section 4 provides that the non-tidal ditches will be considered to be tributaries if they have a bed, bank, and ordinary high water mark; connect directly or *indirectly* to a traditional navigable or interstate water; *and* have one of the following five characteristics:

- natural streams that have been altered (*e.g.*, channelized, straightened or relocated);
- ditches that have been excavated in waters of the U.S., including wetlands;
- ditches that have relatively permanent flowing or standing water;
- ditches that connect two or more jurisdictional waters of the U.S.; or
- ditches that drain natural water bodies (including wetlands) into the tributary system of a traditional navigable or interstate water.¹¹¹

If a ditch is considered a tributary, the agencies will evaluate it “in the same manner as other tributaries (*i.e.*, plurality standard or Kennedy standard, as appropriate).¹¹² Section 4 appears to expand jurisdiction over ditches (in addition to adding the concept of interstate water) by including *all ditches* that connect directly or *indirectly* to a TNW or interstate water and ditches with “standing water.”¹¹³ By including ditches that connect *indirectly* to TNWs or interstate waters, the guidance apparently would include even ditches from which dispersed or underground flow reaches downstream waters. Thus, any ditch that has been in existence long enough to form a bed and bank and is uphill in the same watershed from a relevant water would be a water of the United States if it has any of the listed attributes.

The text of the CWA and its implementing regulations suggests that ditches were not intended to be covered by the CWA. The term “ditch” is not included in any definition of jurisdictional water found in the CWA or the regulations. A ditch is not a “navigable water” in the statute, and “ditch” is not found in the comprehensive definition of “waters of the United States” at 33 U.S.C. § 328.3(a)(1)-(8). This definitional rule contains a long list of examples of what are considered waters, including some relatively uncommon examples (such as playa flats) but, notably, does not include ditches, which are very common conveyances of water. Ditches are, however, included in the statutory and regulatory definitions of “point source.”¹¹⁴ The CWA and regulations thus acknowledge the existence of ditches, but by including

them as point sources-- which can convey pollutants to waters--and not as waters of the United States, it is apparent that Congress did not intend to regulate non-tidal ditches as waters under the CWA.¹¹⁵ This treatment of ditches is further evidenced in Section 404(f)(1) of the CWA, where construction and maintenance of ditches in waters of the United States is specifically excluded from jurisdictional coverage under the CWA.¹¹⁶

Agency guidance does not squarely address the jurisdictional status of ditches. The current guidance, for example, acknowledges that upland ditches are not waters so long as they do not carry a relatively permanent flow of water. The current guidance does not address the converse of this statement by describing when a ditch is a water, but does acknowledge that these geographic features may function as point sources (*i.e.*, “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances”), such that discharges of pollutants to other waters through these features could be subject to other CWA regulations (e.g., CWA §§ 311 and 402).¹¹⁷

Thus, like the statute and regulations, the prevailing guidance treats ditches as conveyances of water (*i.e.*, point sources) rather than waters themselves and does not define a ditch as a water of the United States.¹¹⁸ If a ditch is a point source, one who causes or allows pollutants to be discharged from it can be required to obtain a permit or be prosecuted for discharging without a permit.¹¹⁹ This being so, it is unwarranted to expand the universe of waters by turning ditches into tributaries.

Expanding the number of ditches that will be considered waters of the United States can be ecologically harmful. Ditches can rapidly form channels and bed and bank features and can also relatively easily establish wetland flora and hydric soil if not “maintained” by re-shaping the banks or re-contouring the bottom.¹²⁰ Though there is an exemption from jurisdiction for ditch maintenance,¹²¹ it is more difficult to qualify for when working in jurisdictional waters because of “recapture provisions” triggered by certain effects maintenance may have on jurisdictional functions.¹²² Ditches can often function adequately when allowed to establish the characteristics mentioned above and therefore might not need to be maintained by cleaning out the sediment and plant life. If however, they are converted into jurisdictional waters merely by acquiring these features, they can become expensive impediments to expansion projects and other development. To prevent this from happening, developers must frequently “maintain” the ditches, which can result in preventing the establishment of wetlands vegetation and stream characteristics and the unnecessary release of sediment. Broadening the scope of ditches that will be considered jurisdictional increases the incentive to perform destructive maintenance, an unintended effect that the agencies should consider.

The proposed guidance would cause the presence of “relatively permanent . . . standing water” to convert a

ditch into a jurisdictional tributary.¹²³ The characterization as jurisdictional of a ditch that contains standing water only, without wetland characteristics and without being connected to a tributary or wetland system, is contrary to law and not supported by existing agency regulations. The concept was perhaps inspired by Justice Scalia’s statement that jurisdictional waters include “relatively permanent *standing* or flowing bodies of water.”¹²⁴ If so, however, this reliance is misplaced, since the remainder of Scalia’s statement would contradict the conclusion, requiring that waters “form[] ‘geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’”¹²⁵ Nor would Justice Scalia or Kennedy generally agree that a ditch holding water should be considered a tributary.¹²⁶ Without other attributes of jurisdictional waters, such ditches would be no different from the isolated water bodies disqualified by the Supreme Court in *SWANCC*.¹²⁷

Section four states that natural and man-made swales are not tributaries, but that they, along with ditches, will be evaluated as wetlands under the Scalia and Kennedy standards when they meet the applicable criteria of the Corps of Engineers Wetlands Delineation Manual¹²⁸ or the appropriate regional supplement. In addition, the proposed guidance points out that even when non-jurisdictional, ditches and swales can “contribute to” a surface hydrologic connection between wetlands and TNWs¹²⁹ which, of course, would be a factor supporting jurisdiction under the plurality test of *Rapanos*. The section then addresses how the agencies will apply the two *Rapanos* standards to non-navigable in fact tributaries. Under the plurality test, according to the guidance, a non-navigable tributary is jurisdictional when the tributary “is connected, directly or indirectly through other tributaries, to a downstream traditional navigable water,” and when “[f]low in the tributary, except for drought years, is at least seasonal,” meaning that the tributary “has predictable flow during wet seasons in most years.”¹³⁰ There is nothing controversial about this subsection of the guidance, which appears consistent with Justice Scalia’s opinion, which states that [b]y describing “waters” as “relatively permanent,” we do not necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or lakes that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought. We also do not necessarily exclude seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of the year but no flow during dry months.¹³¹

The proposed guidance departs slightly from the current guidance, by not retaining the three month’s of flow guideline for determining seasonal rivers.¹³² Instead, the proposed guidance states that the time period for seasonal flow “will vary across the country.”¹³³ This approach is more realistic than using a fixed time period justified by any apparent empirical analysis.

The proposed guidance also indicates that the agencies

will only evaluate a tributary under the Kennedy test when they have determined that it is not relatively permanent.¹³⁴ One might expect, however, that in the many appellate jurisdictions that have not decided whether Scalia or Kennedy or both are appropriate for determining jurisdiction over waters, the agencies will in fact perform a significant nexus evaluation for any cases that may involve contested proceedings. Otherwise if a court holds that the Scalia test is not allowable, as in *Robison*,¹³⁵ the agency will not have established a sufficient record.¹³⁶

According to the proposed guidance, and consistent with *Rapanos* (except for the inclusion of interstate waters), the agencies will consider a tributary to be jurisdictional when “(1) It is a tributary as defined for purposes of th[e] guidance to a traditional navigable water or an interstate water; and (2) The tributary, alone or in combination with other tributaries in the watershed, has a significant nexus with the traditional navigable water or interstate water.”¹³⁷ The agency will first determine if the water has characteristics of a tributary, then whether it drains into a TNW or an interstate water or is part of a network of tributaries. Notably, the guidance asserts that if these conditions are satisfied, the agencies would “generally expect” the tributary and similarly situated waters to have a significant nexus to the downstream TNW or interstate water.¹³⁸ The rationale for this assumption is that [t]he presence of a bed and bank and an [ordinary high water mark] are physical indicators of flow and it is likely that flows through all of the tributaries collectively in a watershed with the above characteristics are sufficient to transport pollutants, or other materials downstream to the traditional navigable water or interstate water in amounts that would significantly affect its chemical, physical or biological integrity.¹³⁹

Thus, for most waters normally understood as streams, the agencies will begin with the assumption that the water is jurisdictional.¹⁴⁰ This will not eliminate the need for the agency to build a record of evidence supporting significant nexus, however,¹⁴¹ and the guidance details for tributaries the evidence that the agencies will be expected to develop to support a determination.¹⁴²

Note that the guidance states that in Florida, Georgia and Alabama, the agencies will not apply the plurality test in evaluating streams or adjacent wetlands because of the 11th Circuit holding in *Robison*,¹⁴³ in which the Court held that only the Kennedy test is valid for making jurisdictional determinations for streams.¹⁴⁴

Section 5: Adjacent Wetlands

As with streams, applying the plurality test to wetlands is relatively straightforward. Under the plurality standard, as explained in the proposed guidance, a wetland is considered jurisdictional if it is

adjacent to a relatively permanent, non-navigable

tributary, that is connected to a downstream traditional navigable water, and . . . [a] continuous surface connection exists between the wetland and a relatively permanent tributary where the wetland directly abuts the water (e.g., they are not separated by uplands, a berm, dike, or similar feature).¹⁴⁵

According to the proposed guidance, “a ‘continuous surface connection’ does not require the presence of water at all times in the connection between the wetland and the jurisdictional water.”¹⁴⁶ The guidance appears to be at odds with Justice Scalia on this point, who recognized as jurisdictional “only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, *so that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands.*”¹⁴⁷ Arguably, a temporary breach in the connection between the adjacent wetland and the relatively permanent stream would be a “clear demarcation,” and an adjacent water with such a breach arguably would not be jurisdictional under the Scalia test. The current guidance agrees with the proposed guidance on this matter and provides the following justification:

A continuous surface connection does not require surface water to be continuously present between the wetland and the tributary. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (defining wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support . . . a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.”)¹⁴⁸

This position is perhaps more defensible for wetlands than for streams as wetlands do not always contain water above the surface of the ground, and it is thus not reasonable to require the presence of water “in the connection” at all times for wetlands.¹⁴⁹

In applying the Kennedy test to wetlands, the agencies will assert CWA jurisdiction over wetlands “adjacent to traditional navigable waters or non-wetland interstate waters[,] or to another water of the U.S. when such wetlands have a significant nexus with downstream traditional navigable or interstate waters.”¹⁵⁰ To be considered adjacent under the guidance a wetland must satisfy one of three conditions:

1. There is an unbroken surface or shallow sub-surface hydrologic connection between the wetland and jurisdictional waters; *or*
2. The wetlands are physically separated from jurisdictional waters by ‘man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes, and the like’; *or*
3. Where a wetland’s physical proximity to a jurisdictional water is reasonably close, that wetland is ‘neighboring’ and thus adjacent.¹⁵¹

A primary difference between the plurality and Kennedy


tests as applied in the proposed guidance is that under the Kennedy approach an adjacent wetland is not required to directly abut the connecting water, nor is a hydrological connection required.¹⁵² The proposed guidance elaborates on the meaning of “neighboring,” as including “a demonstrable ecological interconnection between the wetland and the jurisdictional water body.”¹⁵³ An example of such interconnection is “resident aquatic species . . . rely[ing] on both the wetland and the jurisdictional waterbody for all or part of their life cycles . . .”¹⁵⁴

The proposed guidance provides substantial justification for the adjacency concepts posed in the guidance and provides a road map to agency personnel for building a record to support an adjacency determination. It also takes pains to distinguish between what constitutes evidence of adjacency of a wetland to the nearest jurisdictional water and what constitutes evidence of a significant nexus between the wetland and the nearest TNW or non-wetland interstate water.¹⁵⁵ As with tributaries, similarly situated wetlands are considered to be those within the same “point of entry” watershed.¹⁵⁶

The proposed guidance also proposes that all waters adjacent to *interstate waters* (except for those adjacent only to interstate wetlands) are to be deemed jurisdictional. As demonstrated below, this expansion is inconsistent with Kennedy’s interpretation of the statute. In addressing the issue of whether mere adjacency to a connected tributary is sufficient for jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy pointed out that

[in] the administrative decision under review, however, the Corps based its jurisdiction solely on the wetlands’ adjacency to the ditch opposite the berm on the property’s edge. As explained earlier, mere adjacency to a tributary of this sort is insufficient; a similar ditch could just as well be located many miles from any navigable-in-fact water and carry only insubstantial flow toward it.¹⁵⁷

He also reasoned that [t]he Corps deems a water a tributary if it feeds into a traditional navigable water (or a tributary thereof) and possesses an ordinary high-water mark, defined as a “line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by [certain] physical characteristics,” § 328.3(e). This standard presumably provides a rough measure of the volume and regularity of flow. Assuming it is subject to reasonably consistent application, it may well provide a reasonable measure of whether specific minor tributaries bear a sufficient nexus with other regulated waters to constitute “navigable waters” under the Act. Yet the breadth of this standard—which seems to leave wide room for regulation of drains, ditches, and streams remote from any navigable-in-fact water and carrying only minor water volumes toward it—precludes its adoption as the determinative measure of whether adjacent wetlands are likely to play an important role in the integrity of an aquatic system comprising navigable waters as traditionally understood. Indeed, in many cases



wetlands adjacent to tributaries covered by this standard might appear little more related to navigable-in-fact waters than were the isolated ponds held to fall beyond the Act’s scope in SWANCC.¹⁵⁸

Under the definition in the guidance, interstate waters might be any water, “however remote and insubstantial,” including those carrying “minor water volumes,” with the only definitional requirement for such waters being that they cross a state line. It seems likely, in fact, that the reason the agencies have expanded relevant waters to include such potentially remote waters is to ensure that remote un-connected waters and their associated connected and neighboring waters are not overlooked. While the approach is perhaps environmentally more protective, it is not consistent with *Rapanos*. As is the case with the significant nexus analysis for tributaries contained in the proposed guidance, adjacency to an interstate water based solely on geopolitical accident is insufficient for jurisdiction.

Apart from the expansion of jurisdiction with the interstate waters concept and the application of the watershed approach for similarly situated wetlands, Section 5 does not appear to be inconsistent with the current guidance. It does, however, contain a much more detailed rationale for the agencies’ views regarding the concepts of adjacency and significant nexus, citing a full page of scientific articles in support of the concepts.¹⁵⁹



Section 6: Other Waters

“Other waters” are the waters referred to in 40 CFR § 323(a)(3) and corresponding EPA regulations. Referred to as the “(a)(3) waters,” they include “[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds . . .”¹⁶⁰ For these waters, the agencies intend to take a case by case approach in recognition of the fact that that the Supreme Court in *SWANCC* and *Rapanos* have identified limitations on the scope of (a)(3) waters that may be determined to be jurisdictional under the CWA.¹⁶¹ In evaluating (a)(3) waters,¹⁶² EPA and the Corps will make “fact-specific determinations” applying, as applicable, the concepts of the guidance related to significant nexus and adjacency determinations.¹⁶³ For such waters, therefore, the agencies will not attempt to regulate them under the CWA unless they meet the significant nexus analysis of Section 3 of the guidance (including, presumably, adding interstate waters to TNWs for the relevant waters).¹⁶⁴ This approach is therefore consistent with current legal precedent, except for the interstate waters expansion. The (a)(3) waters are not specifically mentioned in the current guidance, presumably defaulting to the Kennedy and Scalia tests.

The guidance also differentiates between “physically proximate” (to jurisdictional waters, TNWs, and interstate waters) and “non-physically proximate waters.” The primary difference appears to be that physically proximate waters are non-wetland waters that “would satisfy the regulatory definition of ‘adjacent’ if they were wetlands,” and include lakes, ponds, and other non-wetland waters that are near jurisdictional waters.¹⁶⁵ The adjacency analysis of Section 5 of the Guidance would therefore be applied. In contrast, non-physically proximate waters are (a)(3) waters that are remote from other waters. Although the significant nexus analysis is to be used for these waters, the proposed guidance recognizes that establishing the requisite nexus will be “challenging.”¹⁶⁶ Accordingly, the proposed guidance does not provide specific guidance for making such determinations. Instead, agency personnel are directed to call headquarters and obtaining approval before asserting or denying jurisdiction.¹⁶⁷

Section 7: Waters Generally Not Jurisdictional

In this section, the agencies list waters they do not consider jurisdictional. An example of listed *non*-jurisdictional waters is “artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools excavated in uplands.”¹⁶⁸ This list not likely to generate controversy.

Section 8: Documentation

This section of the proposed guidance contains the advice, absent in the current guidance, that the agencies should develop a thorough administrative record.¹⁶⁹ The agencies would be well-advised to heed this warning. The proposed guidance provides in preceding substantive sections detailed descriptions of what the agencies should consider in building a record. After years of making virtually unchallenged jurisdictional determinations, the agencies are now faced with the need to build detailed records to support their calls. To date, the sufficiency of the agencies’ evidence has yielded mixed results in the courts. In *Precon*¹⁷⁰ and *Robison*,¹⁷¹ the 4th and 11th Circuits, respectively, found EPA’s evidence insufficient to establish jurisdiction and remanded the cases. In contrast, in *United States v. Lucas*¹⁷² and *United States v. Cundiff*,¹⁷³ the EPA was found to have produced sufficient evidence of jurisdiction. Such mixed results post-*Rapanos* likely were at least part of the motivation for including the documentation section of the guidance.

Appendix

The appendix is entitled “Discussion of Legal and Scientific Basis for Guidance Sections.”¹⁷⁴ It focuses primarily on issues that do not have specific legal support, such as the interstate waters issues.¹⁷⁵ A detailed analysis of this section is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the appendix was written to support the agencies’ position and should be read with that in mind.

Conclusions

The proposed guidance attempts to resolve issues that

were once deemed fairly well-settled but which became problematic after the decisions in *SWANCC* and *Rapanos*. Many of the positions reflected in the guidance seem to be reasonable interpretations of the CWA consistent with the views of the Supreme Court. Others, however, appear to go beyond, or be inconsistent with, current law and might encounter difficulty when subjected to deference analysis. The concept most difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court views is the concept that interstate waters are relevant waters for the purpose of applying the significant nexus test. Other notable issues are the treatment of ditches and the expansion of “similarly situated waters.” The ultimate official treatment of these issues will become clearer after comments are evaluated and the final guidance is issued. Even more eagerly awaited will be the promised rule-making on these issues, which is certain to be controversial. The only thing certain about these matters is that they will continue to be in flux for the foreseeable future.

Endnotes

- 1 The author is grateful for the research and editing assistance of Melissa Oellerich, summer associate for Balch & Bingham.
- 2 Hereinafter, the United State Environmental Protection Agency is “EPA”; the United States Army Corps of Engineers is “the Corps”; and EPA and the Corps are referred to together as the “agencies.”
- 3 Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of the Army, *Draft Guidance on Identifying Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act 3* (May 2, 2011), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/wous_guidance_4-2011.pdf [hereinafter “proposed guidance” in text and “Proposed Guidance” in citations]. The proposed guidance is noticed at 76 Fed. Reg. 24, 479 (2011). The Federal Register notice describes the guidance as “proposed guidance that describes how the agencies will identify waters protected by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act or CWA or Act) and implement the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding this topic (i.e., *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cooke County*, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (*SWANCC*) and *Rapanos v. United States*, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (*Rapanos*).” The comment period on the proposed guidance was originally scheduled to close July 1, 2011, but was extended to July 31, 2011.
- 4 33 U.S.C. § 1251 *et seq.* Hereinafter, the Clean Water Act is referred to as “the CWA.”
- 5 See 33 U.S.C. §1344(a).
- 6 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b) and (c) (civil and criminal enforcement actions for violations of the CWA) and 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a); 1342(a)(1); 1344(a)(1) and 1362(7) (combined, requiring a permit to discharge a pollutant, including dredged and fill materials, into waters of the United States).
- 7 See Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 1 (“This draft guidance clarifies how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) will identify waters protected by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act or CWA or Act) and implement the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the extent of waters covered by the Act (*Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers* (*SWANCC*) and *Rapanos v. United States* (*Rapanos*)). This document clarifies how the EPA and the

- Corps understand existing requirements of the CWA and the agencies’ implementing regulations in light of *SWANCC* and *Rapanos* and provides guidance to agency field staff in making determinations about whether waters are protected by the CWA.”).
- 8 See 33 U.S.C. §1342, 33 U.S.C. §1344, and 33 U.S.C. § 1319, respectively.
 - 9 33 U.S.C. §1362.
 - 10 “Traditionally (or traditional) navigable water(s)” will be referred to hereinafter at “TNW” or “TNWs” as appropriate for the context.
 - 11 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(5); and 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (“waters of the U.S.”). The term “navigable water” is therefore very broad and should be distinguished from the term “navigable in fact water,” which is much narrower. The latter term is used by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in *Rapanos*. See *infra* pp. 2-3 for a discussion of the *Rapanos* decision; see also *The Daniel Ball*, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870), where the term “navigable in fact” was apparently first used by the Supreme Court. Another term for waters is “navigable waters of the United States,” which describes jurisdictional waters under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. 33 U.S.C. § 401 *et. seq.* This term is defined in 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 as those waters that are “subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce,” a definition which is similar to the Kennedy description of relevant waters for applying the significant nexus test in *Rapanos*. The proposed guidance incorporates this definition in the definition of TNW, providing that TNWs include waters that are subject to Sections 9 or 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 6. Note, however, that the Corps regulations provide that “[t]his definition does not apply to authorities under the Clean Water Act which definitions are described under 33 CFR Parts 323 and 328.” 33 C.F.R. § 329.1.
 - 12 *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cooke County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter *SWANCC*].
 - 13 See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217.
 - 14 See 531 U.S. at 165 (citing *U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.*, 474 U.S. 121 (1985)). In *Riverside*, the Court upheld jurisdiction over wetlands “adjacent” to navigable waters. In that case, the Court ruled that Congress intended the term “navigable waters” to include at least some waters that would not be deemed “navigable” under the classical understanding of that term. However, the Court in *SWANCC* noted that there is a difference between giving the term “navigable” limited effect and giving the term no effect at all.
 - 15 *Rapanos v. United States*, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
 - 16 *Id.* at 729. As described by the Court: the *Rapanos* and their affiliated businesses, deposited fill material without a permit into wetlands on three sites near Midland, Michigan: the “Salzburg site,” the “Hines Road site,” and the “Pine River site.” The wetlands at the Salzburg site are connected to a man-made drain, which drains into Hoppler Creek, which flows into the Kawkawlin River, which empties into Saginaw Bay and Lake Huron. The wetlands at the Hines Road site are connected to something called the “Rose Drain,” which has a surface connection to the Tittabawassee River. And the wetlands at the Pine River site have a surface connection to the Pine River, which flows into Lake Huron. . . [t]he Carabells [petitioners in the consolidated case], were denied a permit to deposit fill material in a wetland located on a triangular parcel of land about one mile from Lake St. Clair. A man-made drainage ditch runs along one side of

the wetland, separated from it by a 4-foot-wide man-made berm. The berm is largely or entirely impermeable to water and blocks drainage from the wetland, though it may permit occasional overflow to the ditch. The ditch empties into another ditch or a drain, which connects to Auvase Creek, which empties into Lake St. Clair.

Id. (citations omitted).

17 *Id.* at 730.

18 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).

19 *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 729.

20 *Id.* at 739.

21 *Id.* at 734.

22 *Id.* at 780.

23 *Id.* at 779.

24 *Id.* at 810.

25 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of the Army, *Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States* (June 5, 2007), available at <http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/RapanosGuidance6507.pdf> [hereinafter "original guidance" in text and "Original Guidance" in citations] and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of the Army, *Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States* (December 2, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/CWA_Jurisdiction_Following_Rapanos120208.pdf [hereinafter "current guidance" in text and "Current Guidance" in citations].

26 Current Guidance, *supra* note 25.

27 In the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Circuits, courts have held or suggested in *dicta* that either test may be used to establish jurisdiction. See *United States v. Johnson*, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that a water is jurisdictional if the government can meet either the Kennedy or the plurality standard); *Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y v. Metacon Gun Club*, 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2007) (District Court in 2nd Circuit stated that "this Court will consider [this case] under both the plurality's and Justice Kennedy's standards"); *United States v. Donovan*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94299 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2010) (District Court in 3rd Circuit found that where the various Circuit courts had been inconsistent in which *Rapanos* test to apply, the magistrate judge did not err by applying both the plurality and the Kennedy tests); *Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2011) ("The parties here agree that Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test governs We therefore do not address the issue of whether the plurality's "continuous surface connection" test provides an alternate ground upon which CWA jurisdiction can be established."); *United States v. Lucas*, 516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding jury instructions were not in error when they contained elements of both the plurality and concurring *Rapanos* opinions, requiring the jury to find the wetlands fit both adjacency and significant nexus requirements); *United States v. Cundiff*, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009) (adopting the First Circuit's approach and concluding that either the Kennedy or plurality standards may be met); *United States v. Bailey*, 571 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009) ("we join the First Circuit in holding that the Corps has jurisdiction over wetlands that satisfy either the plurality or the Justice Kennedy's test"). *But* see, with respect to the 4th Circuit, *United States v. Freedman Farms, Inc.*, No. 7:10-CR-15-FL (E.D.N.C., May 18, 2011) (District Court case in the 4th Circuit holding that the Kennedy test applies and the Scalia test cannot be used).

The 11th Circuit appears to be the only Circuit court

holding that only the Kennedy test is valid. See *United States v. Robison*, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding the Kennedy test to be the narrowest grounds and less-restrictive of CWA jurisdiction); accord *United States v. Freedman Farms*, No. 7:10-CR-15-FL (E.D.N.C., May 18, 2011).

The 7th and 9th Circuits applied the Kennedy significant nexus test but stated that the plurality test might apply in some cases. See *United States v. Gerke*, 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that Kennedy's test "must govern the further stages of this litigation"); *Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg*, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the Kennedy test the narrowest opinion and stating that Kennedy's significant nexus test provides "the controlling rule of law for our case.")

For jurisdictional determinations in circuits that have not settled the issue, agencies would be well advised to build a record satisfying both tests, if possible.

28 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007).

29 *United States v. Freedman Farms, Inc.* No. 7:10-CR-15-FL (E.D.N.C., May 18, 2011).

30 *Id.*, Order, May 11, 2011.

31 633 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2011).

32 See *id.* at 288 ("The parties here agree that Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test governs We therefore do not address the issue of whether the plurality's "continuous surface connection" test provides an alternate ground upon which CWA jurisdiction can be established."). On the subject of the apparent discrepancy between the *Freedman* ruling and *Precon*, the *Freedman* trial judge apparently did not believe the Fourth Circuit had spoken definitively, but he did acknowledge that the Court had pointed out that "several circuits held that the significant nexus test alone governed the cases immediately before them, but declined to foreclose the possible future application of the plurality's test as an alternative basis for establishing jurisdiction in other cases." *Freedman*, No. 7:10-CR-15-FL, 12.

33 *Id.*, Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Louise Wood Flanagan in New Bern, NC.

34 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 2 (emphasis added).

35 *Id.* at 1.

36 *Id.* at 9 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added) ("Among the most important tasks for field staff is demonstrating that a significant nexus exists between the 'similarly situated' waters that are the subject of a case-specific jurisdictional determination and the *relevant traditional navigable water or interstate water*.")

37 See *supra* pp. 1-2 and note 11 for a more detailed explanation of jurisdictional waters.

38 *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 739.

39 Current Guidance, *supra* note 25, at 4-5. "Traditional navigable waters" are defined in the current guidance as "[a]ll waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide." *Id.* (citations omitted).

40 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 2. ("This draft guidance provides a more complete discussion of the agencies' interpretation, including of how waters with a 'significant nexus' to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters are protected by the CWA.")

41 *Id.* at 1.

42 The proposed guidance expressly supersedes the agencies' current guidance on *Rapanos*, as well as the agencies' guidance on *SWANCC*, identified in the proposed guidance as "the 'Joint Memorandum' providing clarifying guidance

on SWANCC, dated January 15, 2003 (68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1995)". See *id.* in text and at footnote iii.

43 *Id.* at 2.

44 474 U.S. 121 (1985).

45 531 U.S. 159 (2001).

46 547 U.S. 715 (2006).

47 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 2.

48 *Id.* at 2-3.

49 *Id.* at 3. Section 404(f) of the CWA describes "non-prohibited discharge of dredged or fill material." 42 U.S.C. § 1344(f).

50 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 3.

51 See Corps and EPA Response to the *Rapanos* Decision, Key Questions for Guidance Release at 1 (undated), <http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/13RapanosQ&As.pdf>.

52 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 6.

53 *Id.*

54 *Id.*

55 See, e.g., *United States v. Steamer Montello*, 87 U.S., 20 Wall., 430 (1874), cited for this proposition in William W. Sapp, Rebeka A. Robinson, & M. Allison Burdette, *The Float a Boat Test: How to Use it to Advantage in This Post-Rapanos World*, 38 *Envtl. L. Rep. News and Analysis* 10,439 (2008). This article provides a thought provoking examination of the use of a recreational navigation to enhance navigability determinations.

56 See 33 C.F.R. §328.2(a)(3)(i); 40 C.F.R. §230.3(s)(3)(i); and 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (definition of "waters of the United State" at (c)(i)).

57 Original Guidance, *supra* note 25.

58 This document is now included as Appendix D of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional Determination Form Instructional Guidebook (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/CECW/Docs/cecwo/reg/cwa_guide/jd_guidebook_051207final.pdf.

59 287 F.3d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

60 *Id.* at 1157.

61 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 160.

62 See discussion of deference standards *infra* pp. 10-11.

63 See *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) and *Christensen v. Harris County*, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (*Skidmore* deference appropriate for agency policy statements); *cf. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (greater deference under *Chevron* applicable to agency interpretations of statutes for rule-making).

64 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 7.

65 The order of a stream, in ordinary parlance, is a branch. As explained in the guidance, "[f]ield staff generally should use the Strahler method. In Strahler's method, a first-order stream has no tributaries, a second-order stream is formed by the joining of any two first-order streams, and a third order stream is formed by the junction of any two second-order streams." See Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 7 and n. 14 (citation omitted).

66 As footnoted in the Proposed Guidance, wetlands adjacent to interstate wetlands are not included in the definition of "waters of the United States" contained in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7); 40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)(7) or 40 C.F.R. 122.2 (definition of "waters of the United States at (g)). Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 7 and n.16.

67 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 7 (emphasis added).

68 Current Guidance, generally.

69 547 U.S. at 780.

70 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 7.

71 *Id.* (emphasis added)

72 *Id.* (citing *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 759). Justice Kennedy reinforced this notion and stated later in the opinion that when he referred to "navigable waters" he was referring to "navigable waters in the traditional sense." *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 779.

73 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 7 (emphasis added).

74 Simultaneously with the publication of the original guidance, the agencies also published a memorandum of agreement to address coordination on Jurisdictional Determinations under Section 404 of the CWA) in light of SWANCC and *Rapanos*. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Memorandum for Director of Civil Works and US EPA Regional Administrators* (June 5, 2007), available at <http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/RapanosMOA6507.pdf>.

75 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 8.

76 *Id.*

77 *Id.* The term "region" is used by Justice Kennedy in *Rapanos* to describe the area in which similarly situated wetlands are found. See *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 717.

78 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 9. Though Justice Kennedy used the term "region" in connection with "similarly situated" wetlands, he did not say that the relevant region is the entire watershed of the TNW where the wetlands and tributaries are located. See *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 717.

79 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 9.

80 Immediately after stating that the significant nexus test includes "interstate waters," the guidance cites the following part of the Kennedy holding: In *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers*, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (*SWANCC*), the Court held, under the circumstances presented there, that to constitute 'navigable waters' under the Act, a water or wetland must possess a 'significant nexus' to waters that are or were *navigable in fact* or that could reasonably be so made.

Id. at 7 (citing *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 759 (emphasis added)). This is an interesting juxtaposition of fundamentally conflicting positions regarding the scope of waters subject to significant nexus analysis. Is it a direct challenge to the authority of the Supreme Court or a belief the interpretation deserves *Chevron* deference? See *infra* pp. 10-11 and notes 90-95 for a discussion of the *Chevron* deference standard; see also *supra* note 63.

81 Under the regulatory definition of waters of the United States, tributaries of interstate waters are considered jurisdictional. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(5); and 40 § C.F.R. 122.2 ("waters of the United States at" (e)). This rule was specifically addressed in *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 715. It is clear from the Kennedy opinion that the mere geographic *location* of water, without considering the characteristics of the water, cannot make it a relevant water under the significant nexus test. See discussion accompanying footnote 45, *supra*; see also *United States v. Robison*, 521 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) (proof that tributary at issue was connected to TNW was not sufficient to establish requisite nexus). Another case supporting this proposition is *Precon Development Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 633 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2011). *Precon* involved a 4.8 acre tract of wetlands adjacent to a man-made drainage ditch. The court approved of many of the factors the Corps identified to support significant nexus and agreed that it had properly identified similarly situated wetlands but found that this was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate a significant nexus with the TNW. See 633 F.3d at 293-4.

82 The current guidance states that EPA and the Corps will continue to assert jurisdiction over "[a]ll waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.'

- These waters are referred to in this guidance as traditional navigable waters.” Current Guidance, *supra* note 25, at 4-5. As authority for this proposition, footnote 20 of the current guidance cites 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(1) and explains the “(a)(1) waters include all of the ‘navigable waters of the United States,’ defined in 33 C.F.R. Part 329 and by numerous decisions of the federal courts, plus all other waters that are navigable-in-fact (e.g., the Great Salt Lake, UT and Lake Minnetonka[,] MN).” Current Guidance, *supra* note 25, at 5 n.20. Immediately following this regulation appears 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2), which includes as waters of the United States “all interstate waters including interstate wetlands,” but EPA and the Corps did not assert jurisdiction over these (a)(2) waters. By negative implication, therefore, the current guidance omitted interstate waters from the relevant waters to which the significant nexus test applies.
- 83 No inquiry was made for purposes of this article into the number of waters that the concept might add. EPA is said to have identified remote interstate waters that would be difficult to argue as jurisdictional under *Rapanos*.
- 84 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3.
- 85 The memorandum, entitled *Interstate Waters are “Waters of the United States” Under Section (a)(2) of the Agencies’ Regulations*, is available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/wous_interstate_waters.pdf [hereinafter “Legal Memo” in citations].
- 86 See Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 23-33.
- 87 See generally Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 24-25 and Legal Memo, *supra* note 85.
- 88 *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 759.
- 89 See Legal Memo at 1 and 12.
- 90 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
- 91 467 U.S. at 843.
- 92 See *Christensen*, 529 U.S. at 578.
- 93 As the document itself states, the proposed guidance “is intended to describe for agency field staff the agencies’ current understandings; it is not a rule, and hence it is not binding and lacks the force of law.” Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 1.
- 94 *Christensen*, 529 U.S. at 578.
- 95 *Skidmore*, 323 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added).
- 96 It would also conflict with the plurality test because a remote interstate water and the waters connected to it may be far removed from what may not be “relatively permanent”. See *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 739. As the proposed guidance provides, however, the significant nexus test (where the concept of relevant waters is applied) will only be applied to waters after determining that the Scalia test is not satisfied. Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 13.
- 97 *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 778 (emphasis added).
- 98 Justice Kennedy held that the significant nexus test is to be applied to “wetlands, either alone or in combination with *similarly situated* lands in the region.” *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 780 (emphasis added).
- 99 Justice Kennedy used the term “region” to describe the area where similarly situated wetlands would be found, but he did not “region” as the entire watershed. *Id.*
- 100 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 8.
- 101 Current Guidance, *supra* note 25, at 10.
- 102 According to the current guidance, “where evaluating significant nexus for an adjacent wetland, the agencies will consider the flow characteristics and functions performed by the tributary to which the wetland is adjacent along with the functions performed by the wetland and all other wetlands adjacent to that tributary. This approach reflects the agencies’ interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s term ‘similarly situated’ to include all wetlands adjacent to the same tributary.” *Id.*
- 103 The agencies’ rationale for the concept includes the following seemingly reasonable justification:
It is not appropriate to determine significant nexus based solely on any specific threshold of distance (for example, between a tributary and the traditional navigable water). Watershed ecosystems, and their interrelationships, are constructed of component parts that have relevance when considered collectively. Failure to protect the components can undermine the ecosystem in its entirety. Therefore, the agencies have an obligation to evaluate waters in terms of how they interrelate and function as ecosystems rather than as individual units, especially in the context of complex ecosystems where their integrity may be compromised by environmental harms that individually may not be measurably large but collectively are significant. Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 10.
- 104 Justice Kennedy, for example, did not elaborate on the meaning of similarly situated other than to say the wetlands would be found in the “region.” *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 717.
- 105 If found to be reasonable and not contrary to the CWA and regulations or court decisions, the “similarly situated” concept should be given deference by the courts. See *Skidmore*, 323 U.S. at 140.
- 106 See Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 9-10.
- 107 *Id.* at 10.
- 108 *Id.* at 11.
- 109 The physical description of tributary immediately following this statement seems inconsistent with the concept of a lake being a tributary. It uses the phrases tributary and stream synonymously, and it describes a tributary as having a channel the lateral constraints of which are the “stream banks.” *Id.*
- 110 *Id.*
- 111 *Id.* at 12.
- 112 *Id.*
- 113 *Id.*
- 114 See 33 U.S.C. 1362 (14) and 40 C.F.R. §122.2.
- 115 All tidal waters are jurisdictional under the regulations. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1).
- 116 33 U.S.C. § 404(f)(1)(C).
- 117 Current Guidance, *supra* note 25, at 12 (emphasis added and bracketed material added).
- 118 33 U.S.C. § 1362(15) (point source includes “any ... ditch ...”).
- 119 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) and (c).
- 120 Both of these activities are considered by the Corps to be permissible forms of maintenance. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 07-02 at 4-5 (July 4, 2007).
- 121 See 33 U.S.C. § 404(f)(1)(C) (exemption for maintenance of drainage ditches).
- 122 See 33 U.S.C. § 404(f)(2).
- 123 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 12.
- 124 *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 732.
- 125 *Id.*
- 126 See *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 736 n. 7 (internal citations omitted), where Justice Scalia observes that “[i]t is of course true, as the dissent and Justice Kennedy both observe, that ditches, channels, conduits and the like ‘can all hold water permanently as well as intermittently’ But when they do, we usually refer to them as ‘rivers,’ ‘creeks,’ or ‘streams.’ A permanently flooded ditch around a castle is technically a ‘ditch,’ but (because it is permanently filled with water) we normally describe it as a ‘moat.’”
- 127 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (abandoned sand and gravel pit with excavation trenches that had evolved into permanent and

- seasonal ponds were not jurisdictional when they had no other nexus to waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made).
- 128 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Corps of Engineers Wetlands Delineation Manual, Technical Report Y-87-1 (January 1987), available at <http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/wlman87.pdf>.
- 129 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 12.
- 130 *Id.* at 13.
- 131 *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 756.
- 132 The current guidance defines seasonal waters as waters having a “continuous flow at least seasonally (*e.g.*, typically *three months*).” Current Guidance, *supra* note 25, at 7 (emphasis added).
- 133 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 13.
- 134 *Id.* at 13.
- 135 505 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007).
- 136 See discussion accompanying footnotes 27-33.
- 137 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 13.
- 138 *Id.* at 13-14.
- 139 *Id.* at 14.
- 140 Such water bodies would also likely satisfy the Scalia test as well. See *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 739.
- 141 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 14.
- 142 *Id.* at 14-15.
- 143 *Id.* at 12 n. viii and 15 n. ix.
- 144 505 F.3d. at 1224.
- 145 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 15.
- 146 *Id.*
- 147 *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 717 (emphasis added).
- 148 Current Guidance, *supra* note 25, at 7 n. 28.
- 149 This concept is discussed in the proposed guidance, in the text accompanying note 36. Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 17.
- 150 *Id.* at 16.
- 151 *Id.* (emphasis added).
- 152 *Id.* at 16-17.
- 153 *Id.* at 16.
- 154 *Id.*
- 155 *Id.* at 16-17.
- 156 *Id.* at 16.
- 157 *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 786.
- 158 *Id.* at 781-782.
- 159 See the footnotes at page 36 of the Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3.
- 160 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3); 40 C.F.R. §§ 230(s)(3); and 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (definition of “waters of the United States” at (c)).
- 161 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 19.
- 162 The term “(a)(3) waters” refers to the waters listed in 33 C.F.R. § 328(a)(3) and the parallel EPA regulations.
- 163 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 19.
- 164 *Id.*
- 165 *Id.*
- 166 *Id.* at 20.
- 167 *Id.*
- 168 *Id.* at 21.
- 169 *Id.*
- 170 *Precon*, 633 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2011).
- 171 505 F. 3d at 1208 (finding that the government did not present any evidence . . . about the possible chemical, physical, or biological effect that Avondale Creek may have on the Black Warrior River).
- 172 516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008).
- 173 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009).
- 174 Proposed Guidance, *supra* note 3, at 23-33.
- 175 *Id.* at 24-25.

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