REPORT

LAWYER ADVERTISING RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

I. Introduction

The American Bar Association is the leader in promulgating rules for regulating the professional conduct of lawyers. For decades, American jurisdictions have adopted provisions consistent with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, relying on the ABA’s expertise, knowledge, and guidance. In lawyer advertising, however, a dizzying number of state variations exist. This breathtaking variety makes compliance by lawyers who seek to represent clients in multiple jurisdictions unnecessarily complex, and burdens bar regulators with enforcing prohibitions on practices that are not truly harmful to the public.\(^1\) This patchwork of advertising rules runs counter to three trends that call for simplicity and uniformity in the regulation of lawyer advertising.

First, lawyers in the 21st century increasingly practice across state and international borders. Clients often need services in multiple jurisdictions. Competition from inside and outside the profession in these expanded markets is fierce. The current web of complex, contradictory, and detailed advertising rules impedes lawyers’ efforts to expand their practices and thwart clients’ interests in securing the services they need. The proposed rules will free lawyers and clients from these constraints without compromising client protection.

Second, the use of social media and the Internet—including blogging, instant messaging, and more—is ubiquitous now.\(^2\) Advancing technologies can make lawyer advertising easy, inexpensive, and effective for connecting lawyers and clients. Lawyers can use innovative methods to inform the public about the availability of legal services. Clients can use the new technologies to find lawyers. The proposed amendments will facilitate these connections between lawyers and clients, without compromising protection of the public.

Finally, trends in First Amendment and antitrust law suggest that burdensome and unnecessary restrictions on the dissemination of accurate information about legal

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\(^1\) Center for Professional Responsibility Jurisdictional Rules Comparison Charts, available at: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/rule_charts.html.

\(^2\) See Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers 2015 Report of the Regulation of Lawyer Advertising Committee (2015) [hereinafter APRL 2015 Report], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aprl_june_22_2015%20report.authcheckdam.pdf at 18-19 (“According to a Pew Research Center 2014 Social Media Update, for the 81% of American Adults who use the Internet: 52% of online adults now use two or more social media sites; 71% are on Facebook; 70% engage in daily use; 56% of all online adults 65 and older use Facebook; 23% use Twitter; 26% use Instagram; 49% engage in daily use; 53% of online young adults (18-29) use Instagram; and 28% use LinkedIn.”).
services may be unlawful. The Supreme Court announced almost forty years ago that lawyer advertising is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. Advertising that is false, misleading and deceptive may be restricted, but many other limitations have been struck down.³

Antitrust law may also be a concern. For nearly 20 years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has actively opposed lawyer regulation where the FTC believed it would, for example, restrict consumer access to factually accurate information regarding the availability of lawyer services. The FTC has reminded regulators in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas that overly broad advertising restrictions may reduce competition, violate federal antitrust laws, and impermissibly restrict truthful information about legal services.⁴

The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (SCEPR) is proposing amendments to ABA Model Rules 7.1 – 7.5 that respond to these trends. It is hoped the U.S. jurisdictions will follow the ABA’s lead to eliminate compliance confusion and promote consistency in lawyer advertising rules. As amended, the rules will provide lawyers and regulators nationwide with models that continue to protect clients from false and misleading advertising, but free lawyers to use expanding and innovative technologies to communicate the availability of legal services and enable bar regulators to focus on truly harmful conduct. The amended rules will also increase consumer access to accurate information about the availability of legal services and, thereby, expand access to legal services.

II. Brief Summary of the Changes

The principal amendments:

• Combine provisions on false and misleading communications into Rule 7.1 and its Comments.
• Consolidate specific provisions on advertising into Rule 7.2, including requirements for use of the term “certified specialist”.

³ For developments in First Amendment law on lawyer advertising, see APRL June 2015 Report, supra note 2, at 7-18.
⁴ The recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) may be a warning. The Court found that the Board of Dental Examiners exclusion of non-dentists from providing teeth whitening services was anti-competitive and an unfair method of competition in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Court determined that a controlling number of the board members were “active market participants” (i.e., dentists), and there was no state entity supervision of the decisions of the non-sovereign board. Many lawyer regulatory entities are monitoring the application of this precedent as the same analysis might be applicable to lawyers. See also, ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, FTC Letters Regarding Lawyer Advertising (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/professionalism/professionalism_ethics_in_lawyer_advertising/FTC_lawyerAd.html.
III. Discussion of the Proposed Amendments

A. Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services

Rule 7.1 remains unchanged; however, additional guidance is inserted in Comment [2] to explain that truthful information may be misleading if consumers are led to believe that they must act when, in fact, no action is required. New Comment [3] provides that communications that contain information about a lawyer’s fee must also include information about the client’s responsibility for costs to avoid being labeled as a misleading communication.

In Comment [4], SCEPR recommends replacing “advertising” with “communication” to make the Comment consistent with the title and scope of the Rule. SCEPR expands the guidance in Comment [4] by explaining that an “unsubstantiated claim” may also be misleading. SCEPR also recommends in Comment [5] that lawyers review Rule 8.4(c) for additional guidance.

Comments [6] through [9] have been added by incorporating the black letter concepts from current Rule 7.5. Current Rule 7.5(a) restates and incorporates Rule 7.1, and then provides examples of misleading statements. SCEPR has concluded that Rule 7.1, with the guidance of new Comments [6] through [9], better addresses the issues.

B. Rule 7.2: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services: Specific Rules

Specific Advertising Rules: Specific rules for advertising are consolidated in Rule 7.2, similar to the current structure of Rule 1.8, which provides for specific conflict situations.
SCEPR recommends amendments to Rule 7.2(a) parallel to its recommendations for changes to Comments to Rule 7.1, specifically replacing the term “advertising” with “communication” and replacing the identification of specific methods of communication with a general statement that any media may be used.

Gifts for Recommendations: Rule 7.2(b) continues the existing prohibition against giving “anything of value” to someone for recommending a lawyer. New subparagraph (b)(5), however, contains an exception to the general prohibition. This subparagraph permits lawyers to give a nominal gift to thank the person who recommended the lawyer to the client. The new provision states that such a nominal gift is permissible only where it is not expected or received as payment for the recommendation. The new words “compensate” and “promise” emphasize these limitations: the thank you gift cannot be promised in advance and must be no more than a token item, i.e. not “compensation.”

SCEPR’s amendments to Rule 7.2(b) allow lawyers to give something “of value” to employees or lawyers in the same firm. As to lawyers, this new language in Rule 7.2(b) simply reflects the common and legitimate practice of rewarding lawyers in the same firm for generating business. This is not a change; it is a clarification of existing rules. As to employees, SCEPR has concluded that lawyers ought to be permitted to give nominal gifts to non-lawyers, e.g. paralegals who may refer friends or family members to a firm, marketing personnel and others. Rule 5.4 continues to protect against any improper fee sharing. Rule 7.3 protects against solicitation by, for example, so-called “runners,” which are also prohibited by other rules, e.g. Rule 8.4(a).

SCEPR recommends deleting the second sentence Rule 7.2(b)(2) because it is redundant. Comment [6] has the same language.

Specialization: Provisions of Rule 7.4 regarding certification are moved to Rule 7.2(c) and Comments. SCEPR acknowledges suggestions offered by the Standing Committee on Specialization, which shaped revisions to Rule 7.4. Based on these and other recommendations, the prohibition against claiming certification as a specialist is moved to new subdivision (c) of Rule 7.2 as a specific requirement. Amendments also clarify which entities qualify to certify or accredit lawyers. The remaining provisions of Rule 7.4 are moved to Comments [9] through [11] of Rule 7.2. Finally, Comment [9] adds guidance on the circumstances under which a lawyer might properly claim specialization by adding the phrase “based on the lawyer’s experience, specialized training or education.”

Contact Information: In provision 7.2(d) [formerly subdivision (c)] the term “office address” is changed to “contact information” to address technological advances on how a lawyer may be contacted and how advertising information may be presented. Examples of contact information are added in new Comment [12]. All “communications” about a lawyer’s services must include the firm name (or lawyer’s name) and some contact information (street address, telephone number, email, or website address).
Changes to the Comments:  Statements in Comments [1] and [3] justifying lawyer advertising are deleted. Advertising is constitutionally protected speech and needs no additional justification. These Comments provide no additional guidance to lawyers.

New Comment [2] explains that the term “recommendations” does not include directories or other group advertising in which lawyers are listed by practice area.

New language in Comment [3] clarifies that lawyers who advertise on television and radio may compensate “station employees or spokespersons” as reasonable costs for advertising. These costs are well in line with other ordinary costs associated with advertising that are listed in the Comment, i.e. “employees, agents and vendors who are engaged to provide marketing or client development services.”

New Comment [4] explains what is considered nominal, including ordinary social hospitality. It also clarifies that a gift may not be given based on an agreement to receive recommendations or to make future recommendations. These small and token gifts are not likely to result in the harms addressed by the rule: that recommendation sources might interfere with the independent professional judgment of the lawyer, interject themselves into the lawyer-client relationship, or engage in prohibited solicitation to gain more recommendations for which they might be paid.

Comment [6] continues to address lawyer referral services, which remain limited to qualified entities approved by an appropriate regulatory authority. Description of the ABA Model Supreme Court Rules Governing Lawyer Referral Services is omitted from Comment [6] as superfluous.

The last sentence in Comment [7] is deleted because it is identical to the second sentence in Comment [7] (“Legal services plans and lawyer referral services may communicate with the public, but such communication must be in conformity with these Rules.”) (Emphasis added.).

C. Rule 7.3: Solicitation of Clients

The black letter of the current Rules does not define “solicitation;” the definition is contained in Comment [1]. For clarity, a definition is added as new paragraph (a). The definition of solicitation is adapted from Virginia’s definition. A solicitation is:

a communication initiated by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm that is directed to a specific person the lawyer knows or reasonably should know needs legal services in a particular matter and that offers to provide, or reasonably can be understood as offering to provide, legal services for that matter.

Paragraph (b) continues to prohibit direct, in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain, but clarifies that the prohibition applies solely to live person-to-person contact. Comment
[2] provides examples of prohibited solicitation including in-person, face-to-face, telephone, and real-time visual or auditory person-to-person communication such as Skype or FaceTime or other face-to-face communications. Language added to Comment [2] clarifies that a prohibited solicitation does not include chat rooms, text messages, or any other written communications to which recipients would not feel undue pressure to respond.

The Rule no longer prohibits real-time electronic solicitation because real-time electronic communication includes texts and Tweets. These forms of communication are more like a written communication, which allows the reader to pause before responding and creates less pressure to immediately respond or to respond at all, unlike a direct interpersonal encounter.

Exceptions to live person-to-person solicitation are slightly broadened in Rule 7.3(b)(2). Persons with whom a lawyer has a business relationship—in addition to or separate from a professional relationship—may be solicited because the potential for overreaching by the lawyer is reduced.

Exceptions to prohibited live person-to-person solicitation are slightly broadened in Rule 7.3(b)(3) to include “person who routinely uses for business purposes the type of legal services offered by the lawyer.” “Experienced users of the type of legal services involved for business matters.” Similarly, Comment [5] to Rule 7.3 is amended to explain that the potential for overreaching, which justifies the prohibition against in-person solicitation, is unlikely to occur when the solicitation is directed toward experienced users of the legal services in a business matter.

The amendments retain Rule 7.3(c)(1) and (2), which prohibit solicitation of any kind when a target has made known his or her desire not to be solicited, or the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment. These restrictions apply to both live in-person and written solicitations. Comment [6] identifies examples of persons who may be most vulnerable to coercion or duress, such as the elderly, those whose first language is not English, or the disabled.

After much discussion, SCEPR is recommending deletion of the requirement that targeted written solicitations be marked as “advertising material.” Agreeing with the recommendation of the Standing Committee on Professionalism and the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline’s suggestion to review both Oregon’s rules and Washington State’s proposed rules, which do not require such labeling, SCEPR has concluded that the requirement is no longer necessary to protect the public. Consumers have become accustomed to receiving advertising material via many methods of paper and electronic delivery. Advertising materials are unlikely to mislead consumers due to the nature of the communications. SCEPR was presented with no evidence that consumers are harmed by receiving unmarked mail solicitations from lawyers, even if the solicitations are opened by consumers. If the solicitation itself or its contents are
misleading, that harm can and will be addressed by Rule 7.1’s prohibition against false and misleading advertising.

The statement that the rules do not prohibit communications about legal services authorized by law or by court order is moved from Comment [4] of Rule 7.2 to new paragraph (d) of Rule 7.3.

Amendments were made to Rule 7.3(e) to make the prohibition language consistent with the solicitation prohibition and to reflect the reality that prepaid and group legal service plans enroll members and sell subscriptions to wide range of groups. They do not engage in solicitation as defined by the Rules.

New Comment [8] to Rule 7.3 adds class action notices as an example of a communication that is authorized by law or court order.

IV. SCEPR’s Process and Timetable

The amendments were developed during two years of intensive study by SCEPR, after SCEPR received a proposal from the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL) in 2016. Throughout, SCEPR’s process has been transparent, open, and welcoming of comments, suggestions, revisions, and discussion from all quarters of the ABA and the profession. SCEPR’s work included the formation of a broad-based working group, posting drafts for comment on the website of the Center for Professional Responsibility, holding public forums at the Midyear Meetings in February 2017 and February 2018, conducting a webinar in March 2018, and engaging in extensive outreach seeking participation and feedback from ABA and state entities and individuals.

A. Development of Proposals by the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL) – 2013 - 2016

In 2013, APRL created a Regulation of Lawyer Advertising Committee to analyze and study lawyer advertising rules. That committee studied the ABA Model Rules and various state approaches to regulating lawyer advertising and made recommendations aimed at bringing rationality and uniformity to the regulation of lawyer advertising and disciplinary enforcement. APRL’s committee consisted of former and current bar regulators, law school professors, authors of treatises on the law of lawyering, and lawyer-experts in the field of professional responsibility and legal ethics. Liaisons to the

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5 APRL’s April 26, 2016 Supplemental Report can be accessed here: https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aprl_april_26_2016%20report.authcheckdam.pdf.
6 Written comments were received through the CPR website. SCEPR studied them all. Those comments are available here: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/mrpc_rule71_72_73_74_75/modelrule7_1_7_5comments.html.
committee from the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility and the National Organization of Bar Counsel (“NOBC”) provided valuable advice and comments.

The APRL committee obtained, with NOBC’s assistance, empirical data derived from a survey sent to bar regulators regarding the enforcement of current advertising rules. That committee received survey responses from 34 of 51 U.S. jurisdictions.

APRL’s 2014 survey of U.S. lawyer regulatory authorities showed:

- Complaints about lawyer advertising are rare;
- People who complain about lawyer advertising are predominantly other lawyers and not consumers;
- Most complaints are handled informally, even where there is a provable advertising rule violation;
- Few states engage in active monitoring of lawyer advertisements; and
- Many cases in which discipline has been imposed involve conduct that would constitute a violation of ABA Model Rule 8.4(c).

APRL issued reports in June 2015 and April 2016 proposing amendments to Rules 7.1 through 7.5 to streamline the regulations while maintaining the enforceable standard of prohibiting false and misleading communications.

In September 2016 APRL requested that SCEPR consider its proposals for amendments to the Model Rules.

B. ABA Public Forum – February 2017

On February 3, 2017 SCEPR hosted a public forum at the ABA 2017 Midyear Meeting to receive comments about the APRL proposals. More than a dozen speakers testified, and written comments were collected from almost 20 groups and individuals.

C. Working Group Meetings and Reports – 2017

In January 2017, SCEPR’s then chair Myles Lynk appointed a working group to review the APRL proposals. The working group, chaired by SCEPR member Wendy Yun Chang, included representatives from Center for Professional Responsibility (“CPR”) committees: Client Protection, Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Professional Discipline, Professionalism, and Specialization. Liaisons from the National Conference of

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7 Links to both APRIL reports are available at: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/mrpc_rule71_72_73_74_75.html.

8 Written submissions to SCEPR are available at: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/mrpc_rule71_72_73_74_75/modelrule7_1_7_5comments.html.
Bar Presidents, the ABA Solo, Small Firm and General Practice Division, NOBC, and APRL were also appointed.

Chang provided SCEPR with two memoranda summarizing the various suggestions received for each advertising rule and, where applicable, identified recommendations from the working group.

**D. SCEPR December 2017 Draft**

After reviewing the Chang memoranda and other materials SCEPR drafted proposed amendments to Model Rules 7.1 through 7.5, and Model Rule 1.0 (terminology), which were presented to all ABA CPR Committees at the October 2017 Leadership Conference. SCEPR then further modified the proposed changes to the advertising rules based in part on the suggestions and comments of CPR Committees. In December 2017, SCEPR released for comment and circulated to ABA entities and outside groups a new Working Draft of proposed amendments to Model Rules 7.1-7.5.

**E. ABA Public Forum – February 2018**

In February 2018, the SCEPR hosted another public forum at the 2018 Midyear Meeting, to receive comments about the revised proposals. The proposed amendments were also posted on the ABA CPR website and circulated to state bar representatives, NOBC, and APRL. Thirteen speakers appeared. Twenty-seven written comments were submitted. SCEPR carefully considered all comments and further modified its proposals.

On March 28, 2018, SCEPR presented a free webinar to introduce and explain the Committee’s revised recommendations. More than 100 people registered for the forum, and many favorable comments were received.

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9 Speakers included George Clark, President of APRL; Mark Tuft, Chair, APRL Subcommittee on Advertising; Charlie Garcia and Will Hornsby, ABA Division for Legal Services; Bruce Johnson; Arthur Lachman; Karen Gould, Executive Director of the Virginia State Bar; Dan Lear, AVVO; Matthew Driggs; and Elijah Marchbanks.

10 All Comments can be found here: [https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/mrpc_rule71_72_73_74_75/modelrule7_1_7_5comments.html](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/mrpc_rule71_72_73_74_75/modelrule7_1_7_5comments.html). The full transcript of the Public Forum can be accessed here: [https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/public_hearing_transcript_complete.authcheckdam.pdf](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/public_hearing_transcript_complete.authcheckdam.pdf).

11 An MP3 recording of the webinar can be accessed here: [https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/multimedia/professional_responsibility/advertising_rules_webinar.authcheckdam.mp3](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/multimedia/professional_responsibility/advertising_rules_webinar.authcheckdam.mp3). A PowerPoint of the webinar is also available: [https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/webinar_advertising_powerpoint.authcheckdam.pdf](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/webinar_advertising_powerpoint.authcheckdam.pdf).
V. The Background and History of Lawyer Advertising Rules Demonstrates Why the Proposed Rules are Timely and Necessary

A. 1908 – A Key Year in the Regulation of Lawyer Advertising

Prior to the ABA’s adoption of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, legal advertising was virtually unregulated. The 1908 Canons changed this landscape; the Canons contained a total ban on attorney advertising. This prohibition stemmed partially from an explosion in the size of the legal profession that resulted in aggressive attorney advertising, which was thought to diminish ethical standards and undermine the public’s perception of lawyers.12 This ban on attorney advertising remained for approximately six decades, until the Supreme Court’s decision in 1977 in *Bates v. Arizona*.13

B. Attorney Advertising in the 20th Century

*Bates* established that lawyer advertising is commercial speech and entitled to First Amendment protection. But the Court also said that a state could prohibit false, deceptive, or misleading ads, and that other regulation may be permissible.

Three years later, in *Central Hudson*,14 the Supreme Court explained that regulations on commercial speech must “directly advance the [legitimate] state interest involved” and “[i]f the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction . . . the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”15

In the years that followed, the Supreme Court applied the *Central Hudson* test to strike down a number of regulations on attorney-advertising.16 The Court reviewed issues such as the failure to adhere to a state “laundry list” of permitted content in direct mail advertisements,17 a newspaper advertisement’s use of a picture of a Dalkon Shield intrauterine device in a state that prohibited all illustrations,18 and an attorney’s letterhead that included his board certification in violation of prohibition against referencing expertise.19 The court’s decisions in these cases reinforced the holding in *Bates*: a state may not constitutionally prohibit commercial speech unless the regulation advances a

15 447 U.S. at 564.
16 See APRL 2015 Report, supra note 2, at 9-18, for a discussion of these cases.
The views expressed herein have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and, accordingly, should not be construed as representing the policy of the American Bar Association.

C. Solicitation

Unlike advertising, in-person solicitation is subject to heightened scrutiny. In *Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n*, the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio regulation prohibiting lawyers from in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. The Court declared: “[T]he State—or the Bar acting with state authorization—constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in-person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent.” The Court added: “It hardly need be said that the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.” The Court concluded that a prophylactic ban is constitutional given the virtual impossibility of regulating in-person solicitation.

*Ohralik’s* blanket prohibition on in-person solicitation does not extend to targeted letters. The U.S. Supreme Court held in *Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n*, that a state may not prohibit a lawyer from sending truthful solicitation letters to persons identified as having legal problems. The Court concluded that targeted letters were comparable to print advertising, which can easily be ignored or discarded.

D. Commercial Speech in the Digital Age

The *Bates*-era cases preceded the advent of the Internet and social media, which have revolutionized attorney advertising and client solicitation. Attorneys are posting, blogging, and Tweeting at minimal cost. Their presence on websites, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and blogs increases exponentially each year. Attorneys are reaching out to a public that has also become social media savvy.

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22 Id. at 464–65.

23 Id. at 465-467.

24 *486 U.S. 466 (1988).* *But see, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.*, 515 U.S. 618 (1995). The Supreme Court has upheld (in a 5 to 4 decision) a Florida Bar rule banning targeted direct mail solicitation to personal injury accident victims or their families for 30 days. The court found that the timing and intrusive nature of the targeted letters was an invasion of privacy; and, when coupled with the negative public perception of the legal profession, the Florida rule imposing a 30 day “cooling off” period materially advanced a significant government interest. This decision, however, does not support a prophylactic ban on targeted letters, only a restriction as to their timing. *But see, Ficker v. Curran*, 119 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1997), in which Maryland’s 30-day ban on direct mail in traffic and criminal defense cases was found unconstitutional, distinguishing *Went for It*, because criminal and traffic defendants need legal representation, time is of the essence, privacy concerns are different, and criminal defendants enjoy a 6th amendment right to counsel.
More recent cases, while relying on the commercial speech doctrine, exemplify digital age facts. A 2010 case involves a law firm’s challenge to New York’s 2006 revised advertising rules, which prohibited the use of “the irrelevant attention-getting techniques unrelated to attorney competence, such as style and advertising gimmicks, puffery, wisps of smoke, blue electrical currents, and special effects, and... the use of nicknames, monikers, mottos, or trade names implying an ability to obtain results in a matter.”\(^{25}\) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found New York’s regulation to be unconstitutional as a categorical ban on commercial speech. The speech was not likely to be misleading.\(^{26}\) The court noted that prohibiting potentially misleading commercial speech might fail the Central Hudson test.\(^{27}\) The court concluded that even assuming that New York could justify its regulations under the first three prongs of the Central Hudson test, an absolute prohibition generally fails the prong requiring that the regulation be narrowly fashioned.\(^{28}\)

In 2011, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion, ruling that many of Louisiana’s 2009 revised attorney advertising regulations contained absolute prohibitions on commercial speech, rendering the regulations unconstitutional due to a failure to comply with the least restrictive means test in Central Hudson.\(^{29}\) The Fifth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test to attorney advertising regulations.\(^{30}\) Although paying homage to a state’s substantial interest in ensuring the accuracy of information in the commercial marketplace and the ethical conduct of its licensed professionals, the Fifth Circuit relied

\(^{25}\) *Alexander v. Cahill*, 598 F.3d 79, 84-86 (2d Cir. 2010). The court commented, “Moreover, the sorts of gimmicks that this rule appears designed to reach—such as Alexander & Catalano’s wisps of smoke, blue electrical currents, and special effects—do not actually seem likely to mislead. It is true that Alexander and his partner are not giants towering above local buildings; they cannot run to a client’s house so quickly that they appear as blurs; and they do not actually provide legal assistance to space aliens. But given the prevalence of these and other kinds of special effects in advertising and entertainment, we cannot seriously believe—purely as a matter of ‘common sense’—that ordinary individuals are likely to be misled into thinking that these advertisements depict true characteristics. Indeed, some of these gimmicks, while seemingly irrelevant, may actually serve ‘important communicative functions: [they] attract [ ] the attention of the audience to the advertiser’s message, and [they] may also serve to impart information directly.’” (Citations omitted.).

\(^{26}\) *Alexander v. Cahill*, 598 F.3d 79, at 96.

\(^{27}\) *Id.*

\(^{28}\) *Id.* Note that the court did uphold the moratorium provisions that prevent lawyers from contacting accident victims for a certain period of time.

\(^{29}\) *Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd.*, 632 F.3d 212, 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Note that the court did uphold the regulations that prohibited promising results, that prohibited use of monikers or trade names that implied a promise of success, and that required disclaimers on advertisements that portrayed scenes that were not actual or portrayed clients who were not actual clients. The court distinguished its holding from New York’s in *Cahill* by indicating that the Bar had produced evidence in the form of survey results that supported the requirement that the regulation materially advanced the government’s interest in protecting the public.

\(^{30}\) *Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd.*, 632 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011).
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer to conclude that the dignity of attorney advertising does not fit within the substantial interest criteria.31

[T]he mere possibility that some members of the population might find advertising embarrassing or offensive cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity.32

Florida also revised its attorney advertising rules in light of the digital age evolution of attorney advertising and the commercial speech doctrine. Nonetheless, some of Florida’s rules and related guidelines have failed constitutional challenges. For example, in Rubenstein v. Florida Bar the Eleventh Circuit declared Florida Bar’s prohibition on advertising of past results to be unconstitutional because the guidelines prohibited any such advertising on indoor and outdoor displays, television, or radio.33 The state’s underlying regulatory premise was that these “specific media . . . present too high a risk of being misleading.” This total ban on commercial speech again did not survive constitutional scrutiny.34

Finally, in Searcy v. Florida Bar, a federal court enjoined The Florida Bar from enforcing its rule requiring an attorney to be board certified before advertising expertise in an area of law.35 The Searcy law firm challenged the regulation as a blanket prohibition on commercial speech, arguing board certification is not available in all areas of practice, including the firm’s primary mass torts area of expertise.

VII. Conclusion

Trends in the profession, the current needs of clients, new technology, increased competition, and the history and law of lawyer advertising all demonstrate that the current patchwork of complex and burdensome lawyer advertising rules is outdated for the 21st Century. SCEPR’s proposed amendments improve Model Rules 7.1 through 7.5 by responding to these developments. Once amended, the Rules will better serve the bar and the public by expanding opportunities for lawyers to use modern technology to advertise their services, increasing the public’s access to accurate information about the availability of legal services, continue the prohibition against the use of false and misleading communications, and protect the public by focusing the resources of

31 Id. at 220.
34 Id. at 1312.
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regulators on truly harmful conduct. The House of Delegates should proudly adopt these amendments.

Respectfully submitted,

Barbara S. Gillers, Chair
Chair, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
August, 2018