Bar Rules

Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-1

Ethics & Discipline / Advisory Opinions / Formal Advisory Opinions / Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-1

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-1 (Redrafted Version of FAO No. 03-2)

Supreme Court Docket No. S16U1765

Does the obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, apply as between two jointly represented clients?


The obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, applies as between two jointly represented clients. An attorney must honor one client’s request that information be kept confidential from the other jointly represented client. Honoring the client’s request will, in almost all circumstances, require the attorney to withdraw from the joint representation.


Unlike the attorney-client privilege, jointly represented clients do not lose the protection of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, as to each other by entering into the joint representation. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, Opinion No. 296 (2000) and Committee on Professional Ethics, New York State Bar Association, Opinion No. 555 (1984). Nor do jointly represented clients impliedly consent to a sharing of confidences with each other.

When one client in a joint representation requests that some information relevant to the representation be kept confidential from the other client, the attorney must honor the request and then determine if continuing with the representation while honoring the request will: a) be inconsistent with the lawyer’s obligations to keep the other client informed under Rule 1.4, Communication; b) materially and adversely affect the representation of the other client under Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule; or c) both.

The lawyer has discretion to continue with the joint representation while not revealing the confidential information to the other client only to the extent that he or she can do so consistent with these rules. If maintaining the confidence will constitute a violation of Rule 1.4 or Rule 1.7, as it almost certainly will, the lawyer should maintain the confidence and discontinue the joint representation.[1] 

Consent to conflicting representations, of course, is permitted under Rule 1.7. Consent to continued joint representation in these circumstances, however, ordinarily would not be available either because it would be impossible to obtain the required informed consent without disclosing the confidential information in question[2] or because consent is not permitted under Rule 1.7 in that the continued joint representation would “involve circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.” Rule 1.7 (c) (3).

The potential problems that confidentiality can create between jointly represented clients make it especially important that clients understand the requirements of a joint representation prior to entering into one. When an attorney is considering a joint representation, informed consent of the clients, confirmed in writing, is required prior to the representation “if there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s . . . duties to [either of the jointly represented clients] . . . will materially and adversely affect the representation of [the other] client.” Rule 1.7. Whether or not informed consent is required, however, a prudent attorney will always discuss with clients wishing to be jointly represented the need for sharing confidences between them, obtain their consent to such sharing, and inform them of the consequences of either client’s nevertheless insisting on confidentiality as to the other client and, in effect, revoking the consent.[3] 

If it appears to the attorney that either client is uncomfortable with the required sharing of confidential information that joint representation requires, the attorney should reconsider whether joint representation is appropriate in the circumstances. If a putative jointly represented client indicates a need for confidentiality from another putative jointly represented client, then it is very likely that joint representation is inappropriate and the putative clients need individual representation by separate attorneys.

The above guidelines, derived from the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and consistent with the primary advisory opinions from other jurisdictions, are general in nature. There is no doubt that their application in some specific contexts will create additional specific concerns seemingly unaddressed in the general ethical requirements. We are, however, without authority to depart from the Rules of Professional Conduct that are intended to be generally applicable to the profession. For example, there is no doubt that the application of these requirements to the joint representation of spouses in estate planning will sometimes place attorneys in the awkward position of having to withdraw from a joint representation of spouses because of a request by one spouse to keep relevant information confidential from the other and, by withdrawing, not only ending trusted lawyer-client relationships but also essentially notifying the other client that an issue of confidentiality has arisen. See, e.g., Florida State Bar Opinion 95-4 (1997) (“The attorney may not reveal confidential information to the wife when the husband tells the attorney that he wishes to provide for a beneficiary that is unknown to the wife. The attorney must withdraw from the representation of both husband and wife because of the conflict presented when the attorney must maintain the husband’s separate confidences regarding the joint representation.”) A large number of highly varied recommendations have been made about how to deal with these specific concerns in this specific practice setting. See, e.g., Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1253 (1994); and, Collett, And The Two Shall Become As One . . . Until The Lawyers Are Done, 7 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Public Policy 101 (1993) for discussion of these recommendations. Which recommendations are followed, we believe, is best left to the practical wisdom of the good lawyers practicing in this field so long as the general ethical requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct as described in this Opinion are met.


1See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (“As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation.”)

2See GEORGIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.0(h) (defining “informed consent” as “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct”); see also id., cmt. 6 (“The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client’s or other person’s options and alternatives.”)

3See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (advising that “[a] lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other).

The second publication of this opinion appeared in the June 2016 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal, which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about June 7. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on July 1, 2016. No review was requested within the 20-day review period. On July 25, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.


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