Formal Advisory Opinion No. 99-2
Ethics & Discipline / Advisory Opinions / Formal Advisory Opinions / Formal Advisory Opinion No. 99-2
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA
ISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
ON OCTOBER 18, 1999
FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 99-2
For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see Rule 5.5.
For references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see Rule 1.7(a).
For references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see Rule 1.7(a).
For references to Canon 3, please see Rule 5.5.
For references to EC 3-1, please see Rule 5.5.
For references to EC 3-8, please see Rule 5.4(a), (b), and (d).
For references to DR 3-101, please see Rule 5.5.
For references to Canon 5, please see Rules 1.7 and 1.8.
For references to EC 5-14, please see Rule 1.7(a).
For references to EC 5-20, please see Rule 2.2.
For references to DR 5-105, please see Rule 1.7.
For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, click here.
In a transaction involving a real estate lending institution and its customer, may the in-house counsel for the institution provide legal services to the customer relative to the transaction? May the real estate lending institution charge the customer a fee for any legal services rendered relative to the transaction?
The answer to both questions is "no." An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer. Such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest under Standards 35 and 36. This prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel from attending closings as attorney for the institution and preparing the documents necessary to effectuate the closing including those documents that must be signed by the customer and that may benefit both the institution and the customer. Nor does the prohibition prevent the institution from seeking reimbursement for the legal expenses incurred in the transaction by including them in the cost of doing business when determining its charge to its customer. The charge, however, may not be denominated as a legal or attorney fee but must be included in the charge being made by the institution. There is inherent risk of confusion on the part of the customer regarding the role of in-house counsel. Prudent lawyers will act on the assumption that courts will honor the customer's reasonable expectation of in-house counsel's duties created by the closing attorney's conduct at the closing.
Standard 24, proscribing assistance in the unauthorized practice of law, prohibits in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution from providing legal services to its customers. See also, Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 3; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations 3-1 & 3-8; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Directory Rule 3-101, and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 5.4(d). Standards 35 and 36 prohibit such conduct if the ability to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of one client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the obligation to another client. See also, Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-14 - 5-20; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Directory Rule 5-105, and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 1.7. Specifically, in-house counsel may not provide legal services at a closing or elsewhere to a customer borrowing from the lending institution and arising out of the existing relationship between the customer and the institution. This is true whether or not the customer is charged for these services. The role of employee renders the actions of in-house counsel the action of the employer. The employer, not being a lawyer, is thus being assisted in and is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The in-house counsel by virtue of the existing employer/employee relationship and its accompanying obligation of loyalty to the employer cannot exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the customer.
This prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel from attending the closing as the institution's legal representative and preparing those documents necessary to effectuate the closing. This includes those documents that must be signed by the customer. In such a situation, in-house counsel is providing legal services directly to the institution even though others, including the customer, may benefit from them.
The prohibition on assisting in the unauthorized practice of law does not prevent the lending institution from including the expense of in-house counsel in the cost of doing business when determining the fee to charge its customer. The lending institution may, in other words, recoup the expenses of the transaction including the cost of legal services. This conduct does not in and of itself, create a duty to the customer on the part of the in-house counsel nor does it constitute a violation of the prohibition against the sharing of legal fees with a non-lawyer. On the other hand, charging the cost of legal services to the customer (1) is likely to create an unintended expectation in the mind of the customer, (2) constitutes a non-lawyer receiving the fee for legal services rather than an attorney, (3) constitutes a lawyer splitting a fee with a non-lawyer, or (4) directly invites the unauthorized practice of law. It is accordingly prohibited even if limited to actual costs. The customer cannot be made a part of the attorney/client, employer/employee relationship.
The situation in which in-house counsel attends closings as attorney for the lending institution and prepares the documents necessary to effectuate the closing is fraught with both legal and ethical risks beyond assistance in the unauthorized practice of law and conflict of interests. Even though the above analysis (1) requires that in-house counsel's lawyer-client relationship be restricted to the lending institution, and (2) prohibits the direct billing for legal services by the institution, the fact remains that the customer may benefit from the actions of in-house counsel. Thus the risk of confusion about the role of in-house counsel at the closing will be high. Prudent in-house counsel should anticipate that courts may treat the reasonable customer expectations regarding these legal services as creating duties even in the absence of a lawyer-client relationship. The Restatement (Second) of Torts reports that an attorney who represents only the lender may still be held liable in negligence to a borrower. See, e.g., Seigle v. Jasper, 867 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). A similar result may obtain under traditional contract or agency principles regarding third party beneficiaries. This position is supported by the Restatement of the Law of Lawyering. While declaring the current state of Georgia law on this issue would be inappropriate and beyond the scope of this Formal Advisory Opinion, it is clear that prudent in-house counsel will not ignore these risks both in advising the lending institution and in his or her conduct toward the customer as a matter of good lawyering.
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